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Choices pertaining to education, marriage and migration generally have
profound impacts on individuals’ lives. This dissertation focuses on the role of
incentives in decisions involving education, interracial marriage and migration.
To this end, Chapter 2 initiates a new line of research that investigates the role
of self-employed parents on their children’s post-graduation plans and college
success. Chapter 2 reveals that self-employed parents affect their offspring’s
college success even after accounting for possible ability bias and controlling
for various individual characteristics. While Chapter 2 focuses on the role of
parental occupation on students’ incentives to succeed in college, Chapter 3
and Chapter 4 investigate intricate relationships among education, interracial
marriage, the anti-miscegenation laws, and migration in the U.S. Chapter 3
introduces a study that links previous literatures on the migration of blacks
in the U.S. during the Great Migration with anti-miscegenation laws and in-
terracial marriage. Chapter 3 concludes that anti-miscegenation laws in indi-
viduals’ states of birth affected the sorting of inter- and intraracially married
vi
black males into destination states differentially. Chapter 4 contributes to the
previous literature on the determinants of black-white marriages by focusing
on the impact of geographical variation of the distributions of black and white
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In economics, the assumption of utility maximization, which entails at-
taining the highest level of satisfaction given one’s constraints, is widely used to
explain an individual’s behavior and choices. While the resource/budget con-
straint is the most commonly used form of limitation on individual’s actions,
economic constraints may also involve social constraints. Family, educational
institutions and statutes are among the most important elements that define
an individual’s environment and social constraints. This dissertation investi-
gates choices regarding human capital accumulation, marriage and migration
by incorporating social constraints.
These three chapters extend the literature on the determinants of col-
lege success, black/white interracial marriage and migration by exploring new
directions and providing novel answers to old questions. Although each chap-
ter focuses on a different aspect of individual behavior, they all investigate the
power of incentives shaped by one’s social environment.
Within the organization of a family, parents generally perform an im-
portant role in molding their offspring’s behavior. Chapter 2 initiates a line of
research that explores the impact of parental occupational choices on their off-
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spring’s educational outcomes. Chapter 2 is based on a joint work with Zahide
Eylem Gevrek. It examines the role of self-employed parents on their children’s
post-graduation plans and college success. We examine the influence of family
businesses and self-employed parents on the incentives to succeed in college.
Betts and Morell (1999) and Irandoust and Karlsson (2002) find that college
success is correlated with factors including individual and family characteris-
tics, social background and individual discipline. None of the previous studies
considers nepotism, family businesses and self-employed parents as factors af-
fecting students’ incentives to exert effort in college. Having a family business
implies a larger set of post-graduation opportunities for a college student, and
it may affect the incentives to acquire a high GPA in college.
We use a unique data set from a private university in Turkey. The data
set is assembled by matching college students’ administrative records with
their responses to a survey designed and administered by the authors. This
rich data set has information on personal and family characteristics including
college GPA, scholarship status, post-graduation plans, number of younger and
older siblings, family income, gender, age, year in college, the Turkish Central
University Entrance Exam score or the Student Selection Examination (SSE)
score, college major, parental education and occupations, and family business
characteristics.
We suggest a theoretical framework that generates empirically testable
hypotheses and test them using various empirical methods. Our findings show
that family businesses and self-employed parents have a strong negative effect
2
on college students’ GPAs, after controlling for demographic characteristics,
ability, college major, and parental education.
College GPAs of male students with two self-employed parents or only
a self-employed mother are the lowest, even after controlling for ability bias.
The impact of self-employed parents on female students’ GPAs is similar to
that on male students’ GPAs, except in the category of female students having
only a self-employed mother, for whom parental self-employment has a positive
impact on GPA.
By using the surveyed sample and accounting for possible survey non-
response bias, our results show that the children of self-employed parents are
more likely to have entrepreneurial post-graduation plans. The impact of hav-
ing only a self-employed father on future self-employment plans is large, while
the impact on entrepreneurial intent of having two self-employed parents is
even larger. Students with self-employed parents are not only more likely to
plan to be entrepreneurs, but they are less likely to plan to attend to graduate
school. Chapter 2 explores the limits of nepotism, parental self-employment
and family businesses on their offspring’s behavior, and it concludes that par-
ents not only affect post-graduation plans, but may also have a negative impact
on students’ college success.
Maintaining good relations in a multiracial society depends on the ex-
tent to which different racial groups interact. One important aspect of these
racial interactions is interracial marriages, which work by blurring, if not re-
moving, racial lines in a society. Chapter 3 initiates a new line of research by
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investigating the role of anti-miscegenation laws on interracially married black
males’ migration patterns during the Great Migration in the United States.
Chapter 4 on the other hand focuses on the role of educational attainment on
black male/white female interracial marriages.
From the 1910s to the 1970s millions of southern-born blacks migrated
to the West and to the North. This Great Migration caused a drastic change
in the geographical distribution of the black population (see Fligstein [1981],
Marks [1989], Goodwin [1990], Lemann [1991], Trotter [1991] and Tolnay, and
Crowden and Adelman [2002]). In order to understand the intricate relation-
ship between statutes banning interracial marriage and black male migration
patterns, this study models the destination choices of married black males by
using a multinomial probit model.
I find that anti-miscegenation laws in individuals’ states of birth af-
fected the migration of inter- and intraracially married black males differen-
tially. I use triple differencing to test whether the generation of black males
who were not constrained by anti-miscegenation laws while in the marriage
market sorted themselves differently into destination state groups than those
black males who were constrained by those laws. I find that the younger
generation of married black males who experienced a marriage market free of
anti-miscegenation laws had different migration patterns than the older gen-
eration of married black males. Chapter 3 reveals that the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in the case of Loving v. Virginia in 1967, which forced the last
16 Southern states to strike down their anti-miscegenation laws, affected the
4
destination selection of married black males.
Chapter 4 investigates the role of human capital on black male/white
female interracial marriages. Specifically, it attempts to identify the channels
through which education operates in the marriage market. I use a two-sided
matching model with ex ante heterogeneous agents. The model focuses on
the role of different black and white education distributions on the Interracial
Marriage Probability (IMP), and it has implications for the relative impor-
tance of racial adaptability and assortative mating effects of human capital
on exogamy (interracial marriage). The results show that individual human
capital is important in explaining the probability of interracial marriages. The
main contribution of this paper, however, is to reveal the importance of spa-
tial differences in black and white education distributions in affecting the black
male IMP. The empirical implications of this model are tested by using the 5
percent sample of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the
2000 U.S. Census Data.
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Chapter 2
Nepotism, Incentives and the Academic
Success of College Students
This study examines the effects of family businesses and nepotism on
the incentives to succeed in college. Previous studies indicate that college
success, measured by GPA, is correlated with factors including individual and
family characteristics, social background and individual discipline (e.g., Betts
and Morell [1999]; Irandoust and Karlsson [2002]). None, however, consider
nepotism, family businesses and self-employed parents as factors affecting stu-
dents’ incentives to exert effort in college. The possibility of employment in
a family business implies a larger set of post-graduation opportunities for a
college student, and it may affect the incentives to acquire a high GPA in
college.
According to human capital theory, additional years of education ac-
quired by attending college add valuable skills to the stock of human capital
and increase productivity. As per signalling theory (Spence [1974]), a college
diploma may not add to individual productivity but has an informational value
by providing a signal for innate ability. Either theory can explain the behavior
of a high school senior, without the safety net of a family business, choosing to
6
go to college. Students with family businesses may also choose to enroll in col-
lege to insure themselves against the future uncertainty of relative returns to
different post-graduation plans. Regardless of a larger set of post-graduation
employment options, a rational individual may choose to enroll in college.
When a job requires at least a college degree, years of schooling may
lose their signalling and human capital values for the pool of college graduates.
In this case, employers may focus on other information, such as GPA.1 College
GPA may affect a student’s probability of finding a job irrespective of signalling
ability or acting as a proxy for human capital. Moreover, it is well established
that college GPA may affect earnings.2
The existence of a family business may affect incentives to succeed in
college in two ways. First, students with family businesses may choose to
exert more effort in college and accumulate human capital, because they are
more likely to be the residual claimants on returns to skills in their respective
businesses if they choose to work in the family business or in a new business.3
Furthermore, they may exert greater effort in college because they value the
non-monetary success of their business (either family or a new one) more
1For instance, in the http://www.usajobs.gov/, USJOBS website - the federal gov-
ernment’s official one-step source of jobs and employment information - the applicants are
asked to report their college GPAs.
2Extensive literature substantiates the impact of college GPA and college class rank
on post-graduation earnings (e.g., Weisbrod and Karpoff [1968], Wise [1978], James et al.
[1989], Ehrenberg and Sherman [1999] and Hamermesh and Donald [2008]).
3The intergenerational links in self-employment are very strong. The research on inter-
generational transfer of self-employment finds that the children of self-employed fathers are
more likely to become self-employed (e.g., Lentz and Laband [1990], Dunn and Holtz-Eakin
[2000] and Hout and Rosen [2000]).
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than the non-monetary success of a non-family business by which they were
employed.
On the other hand, students with family businesses may exert less effort
in college if they anticipate a secure job and earnings in the family business
regardless of their college success. This may be true because a family may
have a better idea about its offspring’s ability than other potential employers,
hence the signalling value of the college GPA becomes unimportant. Also, the
family may simply favor its members over other individuals. Besides, aspiring
entrepreneurs with family businesses may put more emphasis on managerial
and industry specific human capital obtained through work experience than
on task-specific career-oriented human capital acquired in college.4
Recent research on nepotism and firm performance shows that nepo-
tism may be an important issue in the U.S. economy. Perez-Gonzalez (2006),
using data from the chief executive officer (CEO) successions of publicly traded
U.S. corporations, calculates that 36.4 percent of the these firms’ CEO succes-
sions involved nepotism. The firms that promote related CEOs significantly
underperform compared to those that promote unrelated CEOs.5 Also, fam-
ily CEOs who attended selective colleges perform better than CEOs who did
4Lentz and Laband (1990) distinguish between the general occupational skills acquired
via college education and job specific skills or managerial human capital acquired by expe-
rience. Lazear (2004) finds that among Stanford MBA alumni, the entrepreneurs study a
more varied curriculum in the program compared to those who work as employees.
5Bennedsen et al. (2007), find a negative impact of related CEOs on the performance of
Danish firms.
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not.6 A high GPA, regardless of whether it has a signal value or adds to hu-
man capital, strongly predicts future productivity reflected in wages earned
as an employee or in the performance of a business. The reason behind lower
performance of related CEOs could be the effort made while in school due to
different post-graduation plans, which previous studies have not controlled.
To analyze the impact of nepotism, family businesses and self-employed
parents on the incentives to succeed in college, we use a unique data set that is
constructed by matching information from two different sources. The first part
comes from a survey conducted in December 2006.7 We surveyed students in
the College of Economics and Administrative Sciences at a major private uni-
versity in Turkey. The second part of the data set comes from the confidential
administrative records of the university. Matching the survey data with stu-
dents’ administrative records would have been impossible in the United States
due to different privacy regulations.
This study initiates an effort to understand the role of incentives shaped
by self-employed parents and post-graduation employment opportunities in
college success. Also our work suggests that if family businesses employ rela-
tives with lower levels of human capital, they may incur non-market costs and
put themselves in a less competitive position compared to non-family busi-
nesses. Favoritism of this kind may affect the health and success of these
6The author defines a selective college as an undergraduate institution that is classified
as very competitive or better in Barron’s, 1980, profiles.
7See Appendix A for the questionnaire.
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businesses and the economy. This implication is closely related to and consis-
tent with favoritism and firm performance literature.
The empirical findings suggest that family businesses and self-employed
parents have a strong negative effect on college students’ GPAs, after con-
trolling for demographic characteristics, ability, college major, and parental
education. GPAs of male students with two self-employed parents or only a
self-employed mother are the lowest, even after controlling for ability bias.
The impact of self-employed parents on female students’ GPAs is similar to
that on male students’ GPAs, except in the category of female students having
only a self-employed mother, for whom parental self-employment has a positive
impact on students’ GPAs. By using the surveyed sample and accounting for
possible survey non-response bias, we find that the children of self-employed
parents are more likely to have entrepreneurial post-graduation plans. The
impact of having only a self-employed father on future self-employment plans
is large, while the impact on entrepreneurial intent of having two self-employed
parents is even larger. Students with self-employed parents are not only more
likely plan to be entrepreneurs, but they are less likely to plan to attend to
graduate school.
2.1 Theoretical Model
The objective of this theoretical framework is to understand how the
presence of family businesses may affect students’ effort and success in college.
After enrolling in college, individuals choose the level of effort to exert in
10
classes. A student who studies harder is more likely to get a higher GPA than
an otherwise identical student. For simplicity, we assume that a student with
no family business may choose to work as an employee after graduation.
College students with family businesses face a larger set of choices upon
graduation. They may choose to work as employees or to work in their re-
spective family businesses. The literature on the intergenerational transfer of
self-employment suggests that students with family businesses are more likely
to become self-employed upon graduation than those who do not have family
businesses. The literature suggests two possible explanations for this phe-
nomenon. First, in the presence of capital market imperfections, successful
entrepreneurs may relax the capital market constraints on their offspring by
transferring their wealth (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin [2000]). Second, intergen-
erational transfer of self-employment may result from parents’ passing work
experience, managerial human capital and industry-specific knowledge on to
their children.
Students who plan to be self-employed may not prioritize college success
as mentioned before. Given time constraints, aspiring entrepreneurs have to
allocate their time between leisure, studying for college classes and augmenting
their managerial and industry-specific human capital by interning and by doing
part time or voluntary work.
The costs of acquiring managerial and industry-specific human capital
and work experience are likely to be lower for a student with a family business,
because she may have better access to business experience. In this case, future
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entrepreneurs may choose to make less effort in college simply because of time
constraints, different relative returns to college success and the possibility of
a lower relative cost of acquiring managerial business-specific human capital.
The next section sets up the environment for a stylized model. Here,
we do not consider the human capital investment at the extensive margin.
Human capital is not measured by the number of years of schooling; rather we
consider it at the intensive margin by measuring the level of effort, which, in
turn, determines a student’s GPA.
2.1.1 Environment
After enrolling in college, students make their post-graduation employ-
ment plans in the first period. For simplicity, we do not consider time discount-
ing. The students may choose to work as employees or become self-employed
by working for their respective family businesses once they graduate from col-
lege during the second period. Utility, defined as U(yi, li) = α1lnyi + α2lnli,
is a function of yi, the earnings in the second period and li, the leisure choice
made in the first period. The parameters α1 and α2 measure the relative
consumption/leisure preference.
If a student chooses to be an employee, she maximizes her utility to
determine li and yi. The output is a function of ei, the effort spent on acquiring
task-specific and career-oriented human capital that is taught in college. If she
chooses to work for the family business, in addition to determining li and ei,
she picks out the level of mi, effort spent on managerial and industry-specific
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human capital. The effort costs of ei and mi are measured in units of time.
The total time available to a student while in college is T . The time
spent on investing different types of human capital and leisure must satisfy
the constraint ei + li ≤ T for an employee and ei + mi + li ≤ T for a self-
employed person. In the second period, the students supply one unit of labor
inelastically.
The earnings, wi, as an employee depend on µi, which captures the
effect of personal characteristics (e.g., race, marital status, gender, physical
appearance) and college grade point average. GPAi = e
βi
i ε is a function of ei
and ε.8 Individual specific βi shifts the production function for college GPA
and captures individual ability. The output of an employee is wi(GPAi, µi) =




The earnings of a self-employed person are f(GPAi,mi, µi) = GPAi[mi
(1 + ψi)]
θiµi, which is a function of college GPAi, effort spent on managerial
industry-specific human capital mi, and personal characteristics µi. The pa-
rameter θi reflects the ability of an individual as an entrepreneur and the ease
with which one can obtain managerial expertise, reputation or industry-specific
knowledge. The parameter ψi ∈ [0, 1) measures the extent of favoritism. If
ψi ∈ (0, 1), there is nepotism in the sense that the contribution of mi is overval-
ued by the family. The parameter ψi = 0 if there is no nepotism involved. The
8ε is a random element with a mean of one and a finite variance.
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utility of a future entrepreneur is U(yi, li) = α1ln{eβii ε[mi(1+ψi)]θiµi}+α2lnli.
We focus on the role of future employment decisions and the impact of
family businesses on the optimal ei. A student who will work as an employee
chooses ei and li to maximize her utility U(yi, li) = α1ln(e
βi
i εµi) + α2lnli,
subject to the time constraint ei + li ≤ T . The optimal solution to this









The optimal effort level e∗i of a future employee is increasing in the
parameters α1, βi; and it is decreasing in α2.
Conditional on choosing to be self-employed after graduation, a stu-
dent determines the level of mi, as well as ei and li to maximize her utility,
U(yi, li) = α1ln{eβii ε[mi(1 + ψi)]θiµi} + α2lnli, subject to the time constraint
ei +mi + li ≤ T . The solution to this constrained maximization problem yields
optimal e∗∗i , m
∗∗













α1βi + α1θi + α2
. (2.5)
Similar to the previous case, a future entrepreneur’s optimal effort ex-
erted in college, e∗∗i is increasing in α1 and βi and is decreasing in α2. Regard-
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less of their post-graduation plans, students with higher βi spend more time
on ei.
Unlike when a student chooses to be an employee, a future employer’s
e∗∗i is decreasing whereas m
∗∗
i is increasing in θi. The students who have
higher entrepreneurial ability and better access to industry-specific managerial
human capital (high θi) will exert a lower effort (e
∗∗
i ) in school, and they
will put a higher emphasis on acquiring managerial human capital (m∗∗i ). As
shown in equations (2.1) and (2.3), the optimal effort exerted in college classes
for future entrepreneurs and future employees are not identical. Comparing
two otherwise identical students, the one that opts for self-employment will








So far, we have considered the effort and leisure choices conditional
on making post-graduation plans. Now, we turn our attention to the factors
affecting post-graduation employment decisions. The utility from being an
employee is U(y∗i , l
∗





i , and the utility from self-
employment is U(y∗∗i , l
∗∗
i ) = α1ln{(e∗∗i )βiε[m∗∗i (1+ψi)]θiµi}+α2lnl∗∗i . A student
opts for self-employment if the expected utility is higher, that is if:
α1ln{(e∗∗i )βiε[m∗∗i (1 + ψi)]θiµi}+ α2lnl∗∗i > α1ln[(e∗i )βiεµi] + α2lnl∗i . (2.6)
The inequality indicates that entrepreneurial intent depends not only on µi,
and θi, but also on nepotism, ψi. Also, in the presence of nepotism, i.e.
ψi ∈ (0, 1), the left side of the above inequality increases in ψi. As a result,
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students are more likely to become self-employed upon graduation.
The model gives two empirically testable hypotheses. First, the off-
spring of self-employed parents are more likely to become self-employed. Sec-
ond, students with self-employed parents are expected to have on average lower
GPAs, because they are more likely to become self-employed after graduation.
2.2 Data Set
The empirical analysis in this study relies on two data sources. The
first part comes from the in-class survey we designed and administered to
the students at the College of Economics and Administrative Sciences of a
private university in Turkey.9 In-class surveys were conducted in December
2006, spanning a period of three weeks. In order to improve the survey, we
pre-tested the initial version on a group of 20 students from another college
in the same university. The final version of the survey questionnaire was pro-
duced by taking into account those students’ answers and suggestions. After
this the students of the College of Economics and Administrative Sciences
answered detailed questions about their personal and family characteristics,
GPA, scholarship status, post-graduation plans, number of younger and older
siblings, and family business characteristics if applicable.
The second piece of information comes from administrative data on all
9The College of Economics and Managerial Sciences offers the following majors: Eco-
nomics, Economics (Honors), Business Administration, Business Administration-Economics,
Business Administration-Economics (Honors), Government, International Relations and In-
ternational Finance.
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sophomore, junior and senior students in the same college.10 We are able to
match the surveyed individuals with their administrative records. The admin-
istrative data contain detailed information on each student’s GPA, gender,
age, year in college, the Turkish Central University Entrance Exam score or
the Student Selection Examination (SSE) score, major, scholarship status,
parents’ education levels and occupations.
Of the 1,122 sophomore, junior and senior students in the College of
Economics and Administrative Sciences, we were able to survey 499 (44.47 per-
cent). The non-surveyed sample consists of the students who failed to attend
class on the day of the survey. We believe that the probability of surveying a
student may depend on a student’s course load along with other determinants
of attendance such as the weather and idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, the
students with heavier course loads are expected to be more likely to appear in
our surveyed sample, because they are more likely to be present in a greater
number of classes compared to those with lighter course loads. The item non-
response rate among the surveyed students was very low, since we monitored
students closely and insisted that they respond to as many questions as pos-
sible.
Summary statistics for the entire sample (1,122), surveyed (499) and
non-surveyed (623) samples are presented in Table 2.1. The first row shows
that the surveyed students have higher cumulative GPAs on a four-point scale.
10The freshmen students are excluded from the sample since their GPAs were not reported
by December 2006.
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Consistent with expectations, the surveyed students take more classes (6.12
per semester) compared to others (5.88 per semester). The surveyed students
are slightly younger, and there are many more female students in the sample
of respondents. The surveyed students, on average, have higher SSE scores.
The education distributions of their parents are similar for surveyed and non-
surveyed students. The average educational attainment of mothers is 11.55
years, while the average educational attainment for fathers is higher 13.37
years.
Seventy-four percent of mothers are either housewives, unemployed or
retired. This percentage is consistent with the 25.5 percent labor force par-
ticipation rate reported by the State Institute of Statistics based on the 2000
Turkish Household Labor Force Survey.
The distributions of parental occupations for the entire sample sug-
gest that almost 45 percent of the fathers and 6 percent of the mothers are
non-professional self-employed individuals.11 Having a self-employed parent
does not necessarily imply that the family owns a business. A family business
requires having employees other than self-employed parents. However, out
of 191 surveyed students who have self-employed fathers, only 4 of them re-
ported that their self-employed fathers are the only workers in their businesses.
The rest of these 191 students reported that their family businesses employed
anywhere from 2 to 1,000 people. Out of these 191 students, 103 of their
11The self-employed category does not include the professionals such as doctors, lawyers,
consultants, and accountants among others.
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self-employed parents do not employ non-family members at the management
level. Students with two self-employed parents and only self-employed moth-
ers reported similar family business structures and self-employment patterns
to those with only self-employed fathers.
Tansel (2001) calculates more recent figures for occupational distribu-
tions classified by urban and rural residence, based on the 2000 Turkish House-
hold Labor Force Survey. Self-employed males make up 27 and 50 percent of
the urban and rural labor forces respectively, while self-employed females make
up 5 and 14 percent of the urban and rural labor forces, respectively. The occu-
pational distributions of the parents in our sample are similar to those of males
and females in Turkey based on the calculations from Census and Household
Survey data sets.
U.S. self-employment rates are somewhat different from the ones in our
sample. For instance Fairlie (1999) calculates that the U.S. self-employment
rate for whites is 15.23 percent. Hout and Rosen (2000), report a 24.2 percent
self-employment rate for fathers, while Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) find that
the overall propensities for self-employment for fathers and mothers are 30
percent and 9 percent, respectively.
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of post-graduation plans for the sur-
veyed students. Sixteen percent of the students plan to work in their family
businesses, and 4 percent are planning to start a new business. We consider
these two groups of students who are planning to be self-employed directly af-
ter graduation as “first-degree entrepreneurs”. Twenty percent of the surveyed
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students said that they are planning to work as employees, while 7 and 17 per-
cent of them said that their post-graduation plans involve either “working as
employees first, and then working for their family businesses,” or “working as
employees first, and then starting a new business,” respectively. We regard
the students who are planning to “work as employees first and then become
self-employed” as “second-degree entrepreneurs.” Thirty-three percent said
that they are planning to go to graduate school and 3 percent said that they
have other plans.
Table 2.2 shows the mother-father matched parental occupation dis-
tributions for the entire sample and the surveyed sample. The upper panel
of Table 2.2 shows that out of 1,122 students, 499 have non-professional self-
employed fathers, while only 64 have non-professional self-employed mothers.
Forty-six students reported having two non-professional self-employed parents.
The most common type of couple is the housewife/non-working mother and
non-professional self-employed father. The lower panel shows that out of 499
surveyed students, 191 and 28 have non-professional self-employed fathers and
mothers, respectively.
2.2.1 The Turkish Educational System
In Turkey the only gateway to enter college is the Student Selection
Exam (SSE). The SSE is conducted every year in mid-June.12 In 2006, the
12See the detailed information on SSE from this link, “http://www.osym.gov.tr/
BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF7A2395174CFB32E15F640FC6104C033D.”
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number of students who took the test was 1,570,357. Public universities had
163,844 spots, while private universities had 24,045 spots. Only 156,120 stu-
dents enrolled in public universities and 16,111 enrolled in private universities.
The SSE has questions that test knowledge of high school curricula and stu-
dents’ verbal, quantitative and analytical reasoning abilities.13
The composite SSE scores are based on students’ performance on the
test and their cumulative high school GPAs. The Turkish Student Placement
Center states that the SSE has two objectives. They are: a) to assure a balance
between the demand for higher education and the number of spots available
in higher education institutions, and b) to select and place students with the
highest probability of success in appropriate higher education programs by
considering their preferences and performance on SSE. The SSE score is well
accepted in Turkey as a good proxy for a student’s ability post-high school
graduation.
In Turkey, public and private universities differ, especially in tuition
and other fees. Public university tuition costs for academic year 2006-2007
vary between $82 and $682, while private university tuition is approximately
$10,600 per year. The private university involved in the current study accepts
two groups of students. The first group consists of those who perform well on
13The Turkish Student Placement Center, the government agency that administers the
SSE, describes the verbal parts of the SSE’s content as “proficiency in the Turkish language,
and the ability to reason, using social science concepts and generalizations,” while “the
major components of the quantitative parts of the tests are the ability to make use of basic
mathematical concepts and rules and ability to reason, using natural science concepts and
generalizations.”
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the SSE and earn an Education Ministry Scholarship. This scholarship pays
for all tuition and school fees regardless of success in college. The second group
is composed of those who score significantly lower than the first group and pay
for their own tuition and school expenses. The University Board of Trustees
awards students in the second group who earn and sustain the highest GPAs
in their majors and cohort a University Merit Scholarship.
2.3 Empirical Framework and Results
The productivity of a self-employed person depends not only on the
level of task-specific and career-oriented human capital, but also on manage-
rial and industry-specific human capital. Children of self-employed parents
are expected to have easier access to managerial and industry-specific human
capital, and their productivity as entrepreneurs may be higher. The first
empirically testable hypothesis implied by the model and the literature on in-
tergenerational transfer of self-employment is that offspring of self-employed
parents are more likely to become self-employed. The second hypothesis is
that students with self-employed parents are expected to have lower GPAs on
average, because they are more likely plan to be self-employed after gradu-
ation. In this section we test these two hypotheses. Not only do we try to
quantify the impact of family businesses, but we also try to understand the
effects of different business ownership structures on the academic success of
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college students. The empirical model is given by:
GPAi = X
′
iδ0 + δ1SEfather only + δ2SEmother only + δ3SEboth parents +
β1(F × SEfather only) + β2(F × SEmother only) +
β3(F × SEboth parents) + εi (2.7)
where i indexes students.
The dependent variable is the cumulative college GPA as of November
2006. The indicator variables, SEfather only, SEmother only and SEboth parents,
take on a value of one if only the father or only the mother or both parents are
non-professional self-employed individuals.14 In order to see if self-employed
parents have differential effects on their sons’ and daughters’ GPAs, we include
an indicator variable for female students and its interaction with SEfather only,
SEmother only and SEboth parents. If parental self-employment has a negative ef-
fect on male students’ GPAs, the estimates of the coefficients δ1, δ2, and δ3 are
expected to be negative and statistically significant. If the self-employment ex-
periences of the parents have different effects on male and female students, the
coefficients of the interaction terms are expected to be statistically significant.
The explanatory variable set in equation (2.7) contains Xi, which is
the vector of demographic, individual and parental characteristics, and εi,
the error term. If parents of students with low GPAs took the unlikely path
of becoming self-employed to secure the future of their offspring, then the
14The omitted group is the students without any self-employed parents.
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indicator variables for parental self-employment, SEfather only, SEmother only,
SEboth parents, and the interaction terms are potentially endogenous to the GPA
equation. In this case, the estimates of δ1, δ2, δ3, β1, β2, and β3 are biased and
inconsistent. We believe that reverse causality of this kind is highly unlikely,
because parents generally make their occupational choices much before than
their children are enrolled in college.
Unobserved ability bias arises if the occupational choices of parents and
parental ability, which is expected to be highly correlated with the offspring’s
ability, are correlated. More specifically, if high-ability parents are less likely
to be self-employed, the negative coefficients for the presence of self-employed
parents are downward biased, and vice-versa. We tackle this issue by including
two proxy variables for unobserved ability, the SSE scores of students and
variables measuring parental education levels.
2.3.1 Impact of Self-Employed Parents on College Success
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results of equation (2.7) for three al-
ternative specifications. Each specification adds more controls to the set of
explanatory variables. In the first we include gender, age, hours studied,
family income, self-employed parents, and female and self-employed parents
interaction variables.15 Column 1 reveals that the impact of having only a
self-employed (non-professional) father on a male student’s GPA is estimated
15Data on family income and number of hours spent studying are available for surveyed
students only. We included two indicator variables for the missing responses of the non-
surveyed students.
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to be −0.19 and is highly significant.16 The impact of having only a self-
employed mother on a male student’s GPA is −0.35 and is significant at the
one percent level. The GPAs of male students with two self-employed par-
ents are on average 0.47 points lower than those of male students with no
self-employed parents.
The F-test rejects the equality of the impact of different parental self-
employment types for male students, i.e. H0 : SEfather only = SEmother only =
SEboth parents is rejected. Having two self-employed parents or having only
a self-employed mother has the strongest negative impact on male students’
GPAs, implying that the different self-employment statuses of parents differ-
ently influence male students’ college success.
The GPAs of female students with no self-employed parents are on
average 0.15 points higher (significant at the one percent level) than those
of male students with no self-employed parents. Column 1 shows that the
coefficients of (F × SEfather only), (F × SEmother only) and (F × SEboth parents)
are not statistically significant. This implies that on average the self-employed
status of parents does not differentially affect their sons’ and daughters’ college
GPAs, when we do not account for possible ability bias.
Column 2 of Table 2.3 shows the estimation results after augment-
ing the first specification with the SSE score (a proxy for ability), indicator
variables for the year of enrollment or test year, the SSE score and test year
16College GPA is measured out of a maximum of 4 points.
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interactions, and seven indicator variables for college major.17 The coefficients
of SEfather only, SEmother only, and SEboth parents are −0.10, −0.23 and −0.30,
respectively. The statistically significant yet weaker negative coefficients of
these variables suggest that if we fail to control for ability, the coefficient esti-
mates for the variables accounting for parental self-employment are downward
biased. Therefore, male students with higher ability are less likely to have
self-employed parents.
These downward-biased estimates imply a negative correlation between
parental ability and self-employment if intergenerational transfers in ability
occur and ability correlate positively with college GPA. The coefficient of the
ability proxy, the SSE score for the year 2002, is 0.012 (t-value=6.00). For the
years 2003, 2004, and 2005, the impact of SSE score on a student’s college GPA
is also positive yet weaker. The inclusion of the SSE score, the SSE year, the
SSE score and year interactions, and college major variables causes a positive
and statistically significant estimate for (F × SEmother only). For the female
students with only a self-employed mother, without controlling for ability we
get downward-biased estimates for the coefficient of (F × SEmother only). This
downward-biased estimate may be due to the fact that the mothers of the high
ability female students are less likely plan to be self-employed.
17The year of college enrollment and SSE year can be used interchangeably, because in
Turkey the SSE scores are only valid for one year.
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2.3.1.1 Intergenerational Transfers of Ability
A college student’s GPA may be positively correlated with parental
education levels, conditional on SSE score. Parental education levels are ex-
pected to be correlated with parental occupational choices. Failure to control
for parental education in the GPA equation may result in biased estimates.
If the highly educated parents are less likely to be self-employed, ignoring
the parental ability bias will result in downward-biased estimates for variables
measuring parental self-employment status.
Column 3 of Table 2.3 adds two variables for parental education levels.18
Interestingly, father’s education does not have a statistically significant effect
on GPA, while mother’s education has a negative impact on GPA. If highly
educated mothers are less likely to be stay-at-home mothers, the negative
impact of highly educated mothers may be due to less time devoted to child
development.
The coefficients of SEfather only, SEmother only, SEboth parents, and (F ×
SEmother only) are significant and unaffected by the inclusion of variables ac-
counting for parental education. The estimation results show that the co-
efficients of SEfather only, SEmother only and SEboth parents are estimated to be
−0.10, −0.22 and −0.30, respectively. The F-tests indicate that the variables
SEfather only, SEmother only, SEboth parents and their interactions with the female
indicator variable are jointly significant in the GPA equation for all three spec-
18The results of Column 3 of Table 2.3 are not affected if we include eight indicator
variables for parental education instead of two continuous variables.
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ifications. Interestingly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of
the effects of having only a self-employed mother or a self-employed father is
equal to the effect of having two self-employed parents (H0 : SEfather only +
SEmother only = SEboth parents). The third specification reveals that possible cor-
relations between parental education and self-employment are insignificant af-
ter controlling for individual ability, since the coefficients of variables account-
ing for parental self-employment are unaffected by the inclusion of parental
education variables.
The OLS results suggest that the children of the self-employed have, on
average, lower GPAs even after controlling for ability bias. If we assume that
they would follow their parents’ self-employment by either working for their
family businesses or starting new businesses, these students may have had no
incentives to exert high effort even in high school. This lack of incentive would
then be reflected in their SSE scores, which are based on the weighted raw
exam score and high school GPA. To examine this issue, we test whether the
SSE scores differ systematically between the offspring of self-employed parents
and non-self-employed parents for various parental self-employment structures.
The null hypothesis is that the difference between the average SSE scores of
the students with or without self-employed parents is not statistically different
from zero.19 If the null hypothesis is rejected, the SSE scores of students with
self-employed parents differ from those of other students and selection may
19The groups are the ones with only self-employed fathers, only self-employed mothers,
self-employed fathers, self-employed mothers, and two self-employed parents. We exclude
any professional self-employed parents.
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be an important issue. Table 2.4 shows that even though students with self-
employed parents have slightly lower SSE scores, in each case we fail to reject
the equality of the average test scores between the students with and without
self-employed parents.20
2.3.1.2 Isolating the Effect of Parents with Professional Occupa-
tions
Next, we investigate whether having a parent with a professional oc-
cupation affects GPA. The data set allows us to differentiate between parents
who are retired, unemployed/out of the labor force, employees, employers and
professionals.21 The professionals may be self-employed (those who have their
own private practices), employees (those who work in a hospital, or a law firm)
or both self-employed and employees at the same time.
The indicator variables SEfather only and SEmother only take on a value
of one if a student has only one non-professional self-employed parent. These
students may have another non-self-employed parent in professional occupa-
tion. If having a professionally employed parent correlates negatively with
college GPA, and if professionally employed people are more likely to marry
self-employed people, then effect of having a non-professional self-employed
parent on GPA may be negatively biased due to the effect of having a profes-
20We also included the SSE score and parental self-employment interactions in our regres-
sions. The coefficients of these interaction terms are not statistically significant.
21The self-employed group excludes professional self-employed parents. Professional self-




In order to separate the impact of having a self-employed parent from
the impact of having a professionally employed parent, we consider the impact
of different parental employment combinations on GPA. Parental occupation is
recoded so that mother/father can either be self-employed (non-professional),
professional, or other (retired, unemployed/out of the labor force, or an em-
ployee). This recoding gives nine mutually exclusive, parental-matched occu-
pational groups.
Table 2.5 repeats the estimation exercise of Table 2.3 by including five
more indicator variables for parental occupation (the excluded group is stu-
dents who do not have any self-employed or professional parents) in all three
specifications.
The coefficients of SEfather only, SEmother only and SEboth parents are unaf-
fected when we include five indicator variables. These variables are : SEfather ∧
Promother , SEmother ∧Profather , Profather only, Promother only and Proboth parents.
The first column of Table 2.5 indicates that the students with SEmother ∧
Profather , Profather only, and Proboth parents have lower GPAs compared to the
ones with no self-employed or professional parents. However, starting with
the second specification, the coefficients of these three variables are no longer
statistically significant. The estimation results of Table 2.5 show that no
matter how finely the parental occupation groups are defined, students with
at least one professional parent have GPAs similar to others.
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2.3.2 Parental Occupation and Post-Graduation Plans
An immediate concern is that the negative effect of self-employed par-
ents on students’ GPAs arise from factors other than a larger set of post-
graduation opportunities. In this section, we quantify whether different parental
employment statuses generate different post-graduation plans. To address this
issue, the surveyed students were asked to choose one of the following seven
post-graduation plans: 1) work in the family business, 2) start a new business,
3) work as an employee, 4) first work as an employee and then work for the
family business, 5) first work as an employee and then start a new business,
6) go to graduate school, 7) or other.
2.3.2.1 Determinants of Post-Graduation Plans
The model and the previous literature suggest that if entrepreneurial
tendencies are passed on from parent to child, the children of self-employed
people are more likely to be self-employed after graduation.






ji + εji > 0] j = 1, ..., 6, (2.8)
where PGPji for j = 1, ..., 6 are indicator variables for six post-graduation
plan categories excluding “planning to be an employee.” SEPji is a vector of
explanatory variables for different parental self-employment statuses. Zi is
a vector of additional exogenous variables that would affect post-graduation
31
plans. These variables are age, SSE score, indicator variables for gender, year
of enrollment, and interaction terms for SSE score and year of enrollment.
Equation (2.8) can be estimated as a multinomial logit model. Table
2.6 shows the marginal effects evaluated at the sample means relative to the
base outcome “planning to be an employee.” The SEPji includes two indicator
variables: SEfather only and SEboth parents.
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Table 2.6 shows the multinomial estimation results based on a smaller
sample, the sample of surveyed students. Students with only a self-employed
father are 26 percent more likely to plan to work in their family businesses than
to plan to be employees. Strikingly, students with two self-employed parents
are almost 62 percent more likely to plan to work in their family businesses.
Students with only a self-employed father are 7 percent more likely to plan to
be employees first and then become self-employed after graduation.
Having self-employed parents not only increases the likelihood of a col-
lege student’s entrepreneurial intent, but also it decreases a student’s prob-
ability of planning to invest further in task-specific human capital. We find
that having two self-employed parents decreases the probability of planning
to go to graduate school by 37 percent relative to the base outcome, while
having only a self-employed father decreases the probability of planning to go
22These indicator variables take on a value one if only the father or both parents are non-
professional self-employed individuals. We cannot control for SEmother only, since having
a mother who is the only self-employed parent predicts some of the post-graduation plans
perfectly. For the same reason, we cannot include (F×SEfather only) or (F×SEboth parents)
interaction terms.
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to graduate school by 10 percent.
Female students are less likely plan to work in the family business or
start a new business than to become employees. Increase in the family income
increases the probability of planning to work in the family business.
In Table 2.6, the χ2-tests reveal that SEfather only and SEboth parents
are jointly significant at the one percent level. However, the choice-specific
(outcome-specific) χ2-tests show that these two variables are not jointly sig-
nificant for planning to go to graduate school and planning to pursue other
future plans equations.23 To test the validity of using a multinomial logit
model, we use Hausman-McFadden’s IIA test (1984). The results in Table 2.6
show the IIA assumption is valid and a multinomial logit model is appropriate.
2.3.2.2 Survey Non-Response Bias
A potential problem with the above estimation, which focuses on the
surveyed sample only, arises from the possibility of a survey non-response bias,
a special type of sample-selection problem. The parental occupation distri-
butions in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show that students with self-employed
fathers are less likely to appear in the surveyed sample than in the non-
surveyed sample.24 The dependent variables in our multinomial logit model,
post-graduation plans, are only available for the surveyed sample. Table 2.1
23Refer to Table 2.6.
24Thirty eight percent of the surveyed students have self-employed fathers, while 50 per-
cent of the non-surveyed students have self-employed fathers.
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demonstrates that the surveyed and the non-surveyed students are not sim-
ilar in many other aspects. Therefore, estimation results based only on the
surveyed sample may suffer from a survey non-response bias.
In order to account for possible survey non-response bias, we estimate
the following two-equation binary response model with selection.
Si1 = 1[Z
′
i1δ1 + εi1 > 0]− surveyed (2.9)
Ei2 = 1[Z
′
i2δ2 + εi2 > 0]− plan to be 1st degree entrepreneur. (2.10)
We can estimate this two-equation model via a maximum likelihood
procedure by making two assumptions: (i) The latent errors, εi1 and εi2, are
bivariate normally distributed with zero means, unit variances and a correla-
tion coefficient of ρ1. (ii) These latent errors are independent of Zi1.
Equation (2.10) is the structural equation of interest, where Ei2 is a
binary indicator that takes on a value of one, if a student i plans to be a first-
degree entrepreneur after graduation. Equation (2.9) is the selection equa-
tion, where Si1 is the survey response indicator and Ei2 is observed only when
Si1 = 1. The explanatory variable set in equation (2.10) contains Zi2, which is
a vector of exogenous variables that would affect post-graduation plans, such
as parental self-employment, gender, gender and parental self-employment in-
teractions, age, SSE score, year of enrollment, and interaction terms for SSE
score and year of enrollment.
To account for a possible survey non-response bias, we need at least
one explanatory variable in Zi1 of equation (2.9) in addition to the Zi2 of the
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structural equation. Otherwise the identification is from the nonlinearities in
the probit equations. A potential identifier should be correlated with whether
a student is surveyed or not, but it should not affect post-graduation plans
directly. As mentioned in the data section, the probability of responding to
our in-class survey is expected to be higher for students who attend many
classes. Therefore the students who take a heavier course load are more likely
to appear in our in-class survey.
We use individual current course load to identify survey response. How-
ever, the students who have entrepreneurial tendencies may consistently take
fewer or more classes compared those lacking entrepreneurial intentions. In
this case using current course load to identify the survey response equation
without accounting for a student’s average course load may be problematic.
To solve this problem, we also control for a student’s average course load both
in the selection equation and in the structural equation. Even if a future
entrepreneur takes fewer classes each semester, accounting for the individual
average course loads, the current course load should not directly affect future
plans. Moreover, as Table 2.1 shows, current course load is clearly correlated
with the probability of being surveyed.
The question of whether a variable is a valid instrument is open to
debate. Nevertheless we see no reason to assume that the course load taken
by students at the beginning of the Fall 2006 semester, controlling for their
average course load, should affect a student’s post-graduation plans (recorded
in December 2006). An instrument is strong if its coefficient is highly signifi-
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cant in the survey response equation. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that if
the t-statistic for an instrument is above
√
10, it is considered to be a strong
instrument. If ρ1 6= 0, students are non-randomly assigned to the surveyed
sample, and the standard probit estimation of the impact of self-employed par-
ents on the entrepreneurial intent without correcting the survey non-response
bias will yield biased and inconsistent estimates.
The estimation strategy can be summarized as follows: We estimate the
selection equation via probit and get δ̂1 in order to construct the conditional
densities, P (Ei2 = 1 | Z1i, S1i = 1) and P (Ei2 = 0 | Z1i, S1i = 1). Then,
we estimate δ̂2 and ρ̂1 via a maximum likelihood model using, P (Ei2 = 1 |
Z1i, S1i = 1), P (Ei2 = 0 | Z1i, S1i = 1) and δ̂1.
Table 2.7 shows the estimation results of the two-equation model de-
scribed above for two alternative specifications. The first specification has
an indicator variable, (1 ≤ SEParent), that takes on a value of one if at
least one parent is self-employed, while the second has two indicator variables,
SEfather only and SEboth parents, to control for self-employed parents.
The first and fourth columns of Table 2.7 present the coefficients from
the probit selection equation (2.9). Having at least one self-employed parent
or only a self-employed father decreases the survey response probability. In
the second specification, the χ2-test reveals that the variables, SEfather only,
SEboth parents, and their interactions with the female indicator variable are
jointly significant in both the selection and structural equations. We find that
female students are more likely to attend their classes, and therefore more
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likely to be in the surveyed sample. Consistent with our expectations, the
coefficient on the identifier variable, the current course load, is positive and
highly significant in all specifications (with t-values larger than
√
10=3.16).
Interestingly the students with heavier average course loads are less likely to
be surveyed.
The second and fifth columns show the marginal effects after estimating
equation (2.10) as a probit model without accounting for survey non-response
bias. Having at least one self-employed parent, only a self-employed father or
two self-employed parents increases the probability of planning to be a first-
degree entrepreneur by 26, 27 and 59 percentage points, respectively. The
impact of having two self-employed parents is the largest on students planning
to be first-degree entrepreneurs. For the students with only self-employed
father or two self-employed parents, the self-employment experiences of the
parents do not differentially affect male versus female children’s entrepreneurial
intent. Older students and female students are less likely to plan on becoming
entrepreneurs.
The last columns of models 1 and 2 show the marginal effects after
estimating the second stage of the two-equation model. The coefficients of (1 ≤
SEParent) and SEfather only are highly significant and much larger than those
predicted from the models that do not control for the survey non-response
bias, while the coefficient on SEboth parents is not affected. The probability
of first-degree entrepreneurial intent increases by 35, 35 and 59 percentage
points for the students with 1 ≤ SE Parent, SEfather only and SEboth parents,
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respectively. This increase is over and above the probability of the baseline
outcome which is 20 percent.25 The negative impacts of age, being female on
planning to be a first-degree entrepreneur disappear when we correct for the
survey non-response bias.
The Wald test statistics for the independence of latent errors, (H0 :
ρ1 = 0), of the selection and the structural equations are insignificant for
both models. Therefore, the Wald tests of independent equations fail to re-
ject the null hypotheses.26 This result indicates that ignoring selection into
the surveyed sample would not render the estimates of the probit model for
Ei2 equation biased and inconsistent, yet some of the estimates change after
accounting for survey non-response bias.
2.4 Conclusion
This study provides evidence that parental self-employment signifi-
cantly affects students’ college GPAs. Our estimation results suggest that
GPAs of male students with two self-employed parents or with only a self-
employed mother are the lowest. Parental self-employment has a similar im-
pact on female and male college students’ GPAs with one exception: Female
students with only self-employed mothers have higher GPAs than those female
students who do not have any self-employed parents.
The inclusion of various controls reduces the negative impact on GPA
25See Table 2.1.
26The correlation coefficients in Model 1 and Model 2 are insignificant.
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in the case of only having a self-employed father by about half, in the case
of only having a self-employed mother by less then three sevenths, while the
negative impact on GPA of having two self-employed parents is reduced by
only one third.
An explanation for the lower GPAs of the children of self-employed par-
ents is that in the presence of inter-generational transfers of self-employment
and nepotism, offspring are more likely to have entrepreneurial intent. Hence,
they may not exert more effort in acquiring task-specific career-oriented hu-
man capital taught in college. As Lazear (2004) suggests, entrepreneurs have
a larger set of human capital than employees, who are expected to specialize
in only one type of skill.
The results also confirm that students with family businesses are more
likely to have entrepreneurial tendencies upon graduation. After accounting
for the survey non-response bias, the probability of having the strongest en-
trepreneurial intent among the students with at least one self-employed parent
is almost 175 percent higher than the baseline case. More interestingly, for
students with two self-employed parents, this probability is almost 300 percent
higher than the baseline case. The children of self-employed parents are not
only more likely to become self-employed upon graduation, but they are also
less likely to plan to attend a graduate school and invest formally in their
human capital.
As implied by the model, the influence of family businesses on offspring
may result from intergenerational ability transfers, better access to managerial
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and industry-specific human capital, and nepotism. An extension of this study
would disentangle the impact of these three determinants on entrepreneurial
intent on college success. Limitations of the data set in the current study
do not permit this analysis. Regardless of the cause, our results suggest that
parental self-employment and family businesses not only affect post-graduation
plans, but they also have negative effects on students’ college success.
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Cumulative GPA 2.42 (0.62) 2.54 (0.62) 2.31 (0.61)
Course Load 5.99 (1.57) 6.12 (1.28) 5.88 (1.76)
Average
Course Load 5.72 (1.16) 5.75 (1.22) 5.71 (1.11)
Age 21.49 (1.60) 21.38 (1.67) 21.58 (1.52)
Female 0.49 0.57 0.43
Major
Bus. Ad.& Eco. 0.11 0.08 0.13
Economics 0.12 0.14 0.11
Government 0.05 0.05 0.05
Eco.(Honors) 0.02 0.01 0.02
Bus. Ad.&Eco.
(Honors) 0.03 0.02 0.03
Int’l Finance 0.12 0.10 0.13
Int’l Relations 0.19 0.23 0.17
Bus. Ad. 0.36 0.37 0.36
SSE Score 253.30 (62.26) 263.05 (58.77) 245.49 (63.90)
2002 169.29 (17.67) 170.18 (17.70) 168.86 (17.67)
2003 285.47 (33.15) 285.20 (33.83) 285.70 (32.69)
2004 293.07 (28.52) 294.86 (27.02) 291.63 (29.68)
2005 291.70 (37.42) 293.23 (37.02) 288.27 (38.53)
Post-Graduation Plans
Work In Family Business 0.16
Start New Business 0.04






Mother 11.55 (4.77) 11.45 (4.74) 11.64 (4.79)





Variable Mean Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean
Entrance Year
2002 0.30 0.23 0.36
2003 0.31 0.31 0.31
2004 0.27 0.27 0.26
2005 0.12 0.19 0.07
Hours Studied 1.79 (1.07)
Mother’s Occupation
Housewife or Does not work 0.61 0.61 0.62
Retired 0.13 0.18 0.08
Works as an Employee 0.15 0.10 0.18
Self-Employed/Business owner/
Employer 0.06 0.06 0.06
Professional 0.05 0.05 0.06
Father’s Occupation
Does not work 0.01 0.01 0.02
Retired 0.15 0.20 0.10
Works as an Employee 0.23 0.13 0.31
Self-Employed/Business owner
/Employer 0.45 0.38 0.50
Professional 0.16 0.28 0.07
Family Income
0-20 thousand YTL 0.18
20-40 thousand YTL 0.17
40-60 thousand YTL 0.12
60-80 thousand YTL 0.12
80-100 thousand YTL 0.096
100-120 thousand YTL 0.08
120-140 thousand YTL 0.044
140-160 thousand YTL 0.04
160+ thousand YTL 0.15
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Table 2.2: Parents’ Occupation Matched
All Students
Father
Mother Does not work Retired Employee Employer Professional All
Does not work 10 86 125 374 95 690
Retired 3 56 27 34 24 144
Employee 3 18 86 34 23 164
Employer 0 4 9 46 5 64
Professional 0 3 12 11 34 60
All 16 167 259 499 181 1,122
Surveyed Sample
Father
Mother Does not work Retired Employee Employer Professional All
Does not work 3 48 32 141 81 305
Retired 2 39 11 18 21 91
Employee 1 12 17 6 14 50
Employer 0 1 2 21 4 28
Professional 0 2 1 5 17 25
All 6 102 63 191 137 499
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Table 2.3: OLS Results: The Effect of Self-Employed Parents on College GPA
Independent Variables GPA (dependent)
1 2 3
SEfather only −0.191∗∗ −0.101∗ −0.100∗
(0.052) (0.044) (0.045)
SEmother only −0.351∗∗ −0.231∗ −0.216∗
(0.093) (0.096) (0.098)
SEboth parents −0.469∗∗ −0.301∗∗ −0.297∗∗
(0.086) (0.088) (0.086)
Female 0.154∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.051) (0.042) (0.042)
Female×SEfather only −0.065 −0.015 −0.015
(0.073) (0.062) (0.062)
Female×SEmother only 0.207 0.272+ 0.264+
(0.177) (0.164) (0.159)
Female×SEboth parents 0.218 0.159 0.160
(0.160) (0.152) (0.151)
Family Income/1,000 −0.003∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Family Income (Missing) −0.374∗∗ −0.254∗∗ −0.246∗∗
(0.075) (0.066) (0.067)
Age −0.028∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.020+
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
SSE Score 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Additional Controls †
Hours Studied Yes Yes Yes
Exam Score ×Year No Yes Yes
Exam Year Indicators No Yes Yes
College Major No Yes Yes
Parental Education No No Yes
F-Statistics and p-values
Self-Employed Parent Dummies 13.42 (<.001) 5.31 (.001) 5.19 (.001)
Self-Employed Parent Dummies and 10.61 (<.001) 3.38 (.002) 3.38 (.002)
Self-Employed Parent×Female
SEfather only+SEmother only = SEboth parents 0.33 (.567) 0.00 (.992) 0.00 (.992)
Observations 1,122 1,122 1,122
R2 0.126 0.382 0.385
The dependent variable is the individual GPA. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The linearized standard errors are
derived from a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respec-
tively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The indicator variables for the Business Administration Economics Combined
Honors major and test year 2002 are omitted.
†See next page for the parameter estimates of these variables.
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Table 2.3: (continued)
Independent Variables GPA (dependent)
1 2 3
Hours Studied −0.038 −0.044 −0.048
(0.087) (0.074) (0.074)
Hours Studied2 0.016 0.018 0.019
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Hours Studied (Missing) −0.024 −0.061 −0.060
(0.109) (0.095) (0.095)








International Finance −0.803∗∗ −0.790∗∗
(0.077) (0.078)
International Relations −0.757∗∗ −0.742∗∗
(0.074) (0.075)
Business Administration −0.816∗∗ −0.799∗∗
(0.069) (0.070)
SSE Year 2003 0.446 0.361
(0.379) (0.379)
SSE Year 2004 0.168 0.076
(0.383) (0.384)
SSE Year 2005 0.326 0.250
(0.499) (0.493)
SSE Score× Year 2003 −0.006∗∗ −0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
SSE Score× Year 2004 −0.005∗∗ −0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002)
SSE Score× Year 2005 −0.005∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.001) (0.002)




The dependent variable is the individual GPA. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The linearized standard errors are
derived from a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respec-
tively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The indicator variables for the Business Administration Economics Combined
Honors major and test year 2002 are omitted.
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Table 2.4: Testing the Equality of the SSE Scores by Parents’ Occupation
N Mean Std.Err. t-value
(Only) Father Employer
Other 669 255.34 2.48
Employer (Non-Professional) 453 250.29 2.79
difference 5.05 3.78 1.33
P-value (.18)
(Only) Mother Employer
Other 1,104 253.66 1.87
Employer (Non-Professional) 18 230.92 16.69
difference 22.74 14.78 1.53
P-value (.12)
Father Employer
Other 623 255.67 2.60
Employer (Non-Professional) 499 250.33 2.63
difference 5.34 3.74 1.42
P-value (.15)
Mother Employer
Other 1,058 253.79 1.92
Employer (Non-Professional) 64 245.20 7.35
difference 8.59 8.03 1.97
P-value (.28)
Both Parents
Other 1,076 253.41 1.90
Employer (Non-Professional) 46 250.78 7.85
difference 2.62 9.37 0.28
P-value (.78)
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Professional Parents on College GPA
Independent Variables GPA (dependent)
1 2 3
(i) SEfather only −.270∗∗ −.080∗ −.091∗
(.042) (.037) (.038)
(ii) SEmother only −.250+ −.068 −.056
(.142) (.131) (.126)
(iii) SEboth parents −.418∗∗ −.231∗∗ −.221∗∗
(.082) (.078) (.078)
(iv) SEfather ∧ Promother −.237 −.108 −.071
(.148) (.106) (.104)
(v) SEmother ∧ Profather −.260∗ −.012 .007
(.109) (.120) (.116)
(vi) Profather only −.127∗ .013 .017
(.059) (.051) (.051)
(vii) Promother only −.199 −.062 −.031
(.131) (.141) (.141)
(viii) Proboth parents −.179+ −.059 −.018
(.101) (.052) (.085)
Family Income/1,000 −0.003∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Family Income (Missing) −0.370∗∗ −0.253∗∗ −0.246∗∗
(0.075) (0.066) (0.066)
Age −0.031∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.020+
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Female 0.145∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
SSE Score 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Additional Controls †
Hours Studied Yes Yes Yes
Exam Score ×Year No Yes Yes
Exam Year Indicators No Yes Yes
College Major No Yes Yes
Parental Education No No Yes
Observations 1,122 1,122 1,122
R2 .129 .381 .384
The dependent variable is the individual GPA. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The linearized standard errors are
derived from a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respec-
tively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The indicator variables for the Business Administration Economics Combined
Honors major and test year 2002 are omitted.
†See next page for the parameter estimates of these variables.
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Table 2.5: (continued)
Independent Variables GPA (dependent)
1 2 3
Hours Studied −0.035 −0.044 −0.048
(0.087) (0.075) (0.075)
Hours Studied2 0.016 0.018 0.019
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Hours Studied (Missing) −0.029 −0.060 −0.059
(0.109) (0.096) (0.096)








Int’l Finance −0.804∗∗ −0.793∗∗
(0.076) (0.077)
Int’l Relations −0.757∗∗ −0.745∗∗
(0.074) (0.075)
Bus. Administration −0.816∗∗ −0.801∗∗
(0.069) (0.070)
SSE Year 2003 0.449 0.370
(0.379) (0.378)
SSE Year 2004 0.191 0.102
(0.378) (0.379)
SSE Year 2005 0.352 0.274
(0.503) (0.498)
SSE Score× Year 2003 −0.006∗∗ −0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
SSE Score× Year 2004 −0.005∗∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
SSE Score× Year 2005 −0.005∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.001) (0.002)





Table 2.6: Multinomial Logit: The Determinants of Post-Graduation Plans,
Marginal Effects, Base Outcome=Plan to be an Employee (N=499)
Family New Employee→ Employee→ Graduate Other
Business Bus. Family Bus. New Bus. School
(i) SEfather only .265
∗∗ .005 .071∗ −.019 −.103+ −.037+
(.049) (.004) (.031) (.012) (.057) (.027)
(ii) SEboth parents .616
∗∗ −.029∗∗ .148 −.212 −.367∗∗ .004
(.104) (.009) (.097) (.021) (.051) (.022)
Age −.008 −.004∗ −.016 .001 .015 −.002
(.011) (.002) (.010) (.005) (.019) (.003)
Female −.078∗ −.008+ −.020 −.008 .039 −.003
(.032) (.004) (.025) (.013) (.053) (.012)
Income/1,000 .0009∗∗ .0002 .0002 .0003 −.0004 −.0003∗
(.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.002) (.0005) (.0001)
SSE Score −.008∗∗ −.0008∗∗ −.003∗∗ −.0005 .011∗∗ −.001
(.002) (.0003) (.001) (.0008) (.003) (.008)
Year 2003 −.539∗ −.177 −.015 −.029 .962∗∗ −.023
(.280) (.233) (.035) (.038) (.045) (.041)
Year 2004 −.283 −.221 .035 −.077 .530 −.094
(.241) (.313) (.024) (.089) (.633) (.132)
Year 2005 −.339∗ −.021 −.095 −.043 −.115 −.147
(.160) (.027) (.084) (.038) (.476) (.164)
SSE × 2003 .007∗∗ .0007∗ .002 .006 −.012∗∗ .001
(.002) (.0002) (.002) (.009) (.003) (.001)
SSE × 2004 .005∗ .0007∗ .001 .008 −.007+ .001
(.002) (.0003) (.001) (.009) (.004) (.001)
SSE × 2005 .006∗∗ .0005 .002+ .003 −.006+ .001
(.002) (.0003) (.001) (.009) (.003) (.001)
χ2 (Pr>χ2) 23,806 (<.001)
Pseudo R2 .152
Log Pseudolikelihood -727.35
χ2 Stat for (i)=(ii)=0 17,600
[dof] [12]
(Pr>χ2) (<.001)
Choice Spec. χ2 53.94 4157.06 19.48 3,575 4.03 3.80
[dof] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2]
(i)=(ii)=0 (Pr>χ2) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.133) (.149)
Hausman Tests Of IIA Assumption H0=Odds are Independent of Other Alternatives
χ2 df. (P > χ2) Evidence
Work in the Family Firm .000 2 >.999 for H0
Start a New Firm .000 1 >.999 for H0
Employee→Family Firm .000 2 >.999 for H0
Employee→New Firm .000 1 >.999 for H0
Graduate School .000 2 >.999 for H0
Other .000 2 >.999 for H0
Work as an Employee .000 2 >.999 for H0
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance
matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The
indicator variable for test year 2002 is omitted. The results reported for the multinomial estimations are marginal effects
rather than coefficients.
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Table 2.7: The Determinants of Entrepreneurial Intent: Marginal Effects After
Maximum Likelihood Probit Model with Sample Selection
Model 1 Model 2
Pr(1stDegree Entre.=1) Pr(1stDegree Entre.=1)
Pr(Survey Not Corrected Pr(Survey Not Corrected
ed=1) Corrected ed=1) Corrected
Current Course .089∗∗ ... ... .090∗∗ ... ...
Load (.026) ... ... (.027) ... ...
(1≤ SEParent) −.201+ .262∗∗ .346∗ ... ... ...
(.122) (.057) (.142) ... ... ...
F×(1≤ SEParent) −.178 −.023 −.023 ... ... ...
(.158) (.063) (.094) ... ... ...
SEfather only ... ... ... −.267∗ .273∗∗ .354∗
... ... ... (.116) (.064) (.162)
SEboth parents ... ... ... .153 .595
∗∗ .594∗∗
... ... ... (.268) (.137) (.159)
F×SEfather only ... ... ... −.089 −.020 −.026
... ... ... (.163) (.064) (.092)
F×SEboth parents ... ... ... −.518 −.056 −.062
... ... ... (.495) (.098) (.169)
Avg. Course Load −.177∗∗ −.018 −.037 −.182∗∗ .017 .035
(.041) (.016) (.43) (.041) (.015) (.047)
Age .058∗ −.026∗ −.040 .057+ −.024∗ −.038
(.030) (.011) (.028) (.030) (.011) (.031)
Female .493∗∗ −.094+ −.160 .466∗∗ −.089+ −.149
(.107) (.053) (.152) (.105) (.052) (.157)
SSE Score −.002 −.009∗∗ −.014∗∗ −.002 −.010∗∗ −.014∗
(.004) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.006)
Year 2003 .451 −.757∗∗ −.866∗∗ .501 −.799∗∗ −.891∗∗
(.935) (.172) (.170) (.923) (.156) (.155)
Year 2004 −.756 −.566∗ −.689∗∗ −.766 −.591∗ −.705∗∗
(1.03) (.230) (.266) (1.03) (.233) (.270)
Year 2005 −.366 −.362∗ −.415 −.334 −.404∗∗ −.431
(1.23) (.146) (.276) (1.23) (.155) (.296)
SSE × Year 2003 .0004 .009∗∗ .012∗ .0001 .009∗∗ .012∗
(.0004) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.005)
SSE × Year 2004 .005 .007∗∗ .010∗ .005 .007∗∗ .010∗
(.005) (.002) (.004) (.005) (.002) (.004)
SSE × Year 2005 .006 .007∗∗ .009∗ .007 .007∗∗ .010∗
(.005) (.002) (.003) (.005) (.002) (.004)
Observations 1,108 485 1,108 1,108 485 1,108
Log Pseudo L. -891.1 -191.3 -891.1 -885.2 -186.2 -885.2bρ (std. err.) −.323(.703) ... −.303(.766) ...
Wald for ρ = 0
(p) .18 (.66) ... .14 (.71) ...
χ2-Stat for SEParent ... ... ... 32.81 31.77 32.81
Dummies (p) ... ... ... (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
χ2-Stat for SEParent 57.23 43.45 57.23 64.52 53.08 64.52
Dummies×F (p) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance
matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The
indicator variable for test year 2002 is omitted. The results reported for the entrepreneurial intent equation estimations are





THE LAND OF HOPE
Yes, we are going to the north!
I don’t care to what state
Just so I cross the Dixon line,
From this southern land of hate,
Lynched and burned and shot and hiring,
And not a word is said.
No law whatever the protect
It’s just a “nigger” dead.
Go on dear brother you’ll ne’er regret;
Just trust in God; pray for the best.
And at the end you’re sure to find
“happiness will be there.”1
From the early twentieth century to the 1970s, the United States wit-
nessed a massive migration of southern-born Americans to the West and to the
North in search of better lives.2 This mass emigration of blacks from the South-
ern states, also known as the “Great Migration,” resulted in a drastic change in
the geographical distribution of the black population (Fligstein [1981], Marks
[1989], Goodwin [1990], Lemann [1991], Trotter [1991] and Tolnay, and Crow-
1By William Crosse.
2There are various definitions of the “South”, in this study I use the definition of the
Southern region by the United States Census Bureau, which includes Alabama, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of
Columbia.
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den and Adelman [2002]). In the first decade of the 20th century, 90 percent of
blacks lived in the South, while only 4.4 percent lived in the Northeast, and 5.6
percent lived in the Midwest. However, by the 1970s only 53 percent of blacks
lived in the South, while 19.3, 20.2, and 7.5 percent lived in the Midwest,
Northeast and West respectively (U.S. Census Bureau [2002], Tolnay [2003]).
A limited number of studies explored social forces affecting black migra-
tion during the Great Migration. Previous literature considers racial violence
and inequality, which were promoted by the Jim Crow laws in effect from 1877
until the mid-1970s, in the Southern and the Border states, among the most
important social push factors that drove migrants to leave their places of ori-
gin (for instance see Fligstein [1981], Grossman [1989], Marks [1989], Goodwin
[1990], Lemann [1991], Trotter [1991], and Tolnay and Beck [1992]).
Traces of racial segregation can be found much earlier even in the do-
main of intimate relationships between blacks and whites. Anti-miscegenation
laws banning interracial relationships between blacks and whites were enforced
as early as 1662 (Newbeck [2004] and Wallenstein [2004]). Forty-one states out-
lawed black-white interracial marriage at some point in U.S. history (Browning
[1951] and Newbeck [2004]). Table 3.1 shows a list of states categorized by
the year of their ban of anti-miscegenation laws. Virginia was the first to ban
interracial marriages and its anti-miscegenation laws had been effective for
305 years. Eleven of these 41 states repealed their anti-miscegenation laws in
the 19th century, and with the lead of California in 1948, another 14 repealed
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their laws before 1967.3 Maryland was the last state that voluntarily revoked
its anti-miscegenation statutes (in 1967). However, 16 southern states were
forced to do so by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case of Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).4 In June 12, 1967, Chief Justice Warren delivered
the opinion of the Court:
This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by
this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of
Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of
racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
...In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro
woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the
District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their mar-
riage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their mar-
ital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the
Circuit Court [388 U.S. 1, 3] of Caroline County, a grand jury is-
sued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia’s
ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings
pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail;
3Fryer (2007) classifies Kansas, New Mexico and Washington in the Never illegal group,
because these states repealed the laws before the 1900s and before their statehood. Here
they are classified in the 19th Century legalized group, because regardless of statehood, they
repealed these laws before the 1900s.
4The Loving state group does not entirely correspond to the definition of the Southern
region by the United States Census Bureau. The Loving states also includes Missouri and
excludes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, I call the Loving states as
the Southern states.
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however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25
years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not
return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion
that:
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate conti-
nents. And but for the interference with his arrange-
ment there would be no cause for such marriages. The
fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mix.” ...
Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental
to our very existence and survival. ...The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the free-
dom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. These con-
victions must be reversed. It is so ordered.5
In 9 states interracial marriage has never been illegal. The U.S. map
in Figure 3.1 shows these four main state groups: 9 “Never illegal” states,
11 states in the “19th Century legalized” group, 14 states in the “1948-1967
Legalized” group and the “Loving” group of 16 states that had to remove the
ban on interracial marriage after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1967. A
5FindLaw: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/388/
1.html.
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way to describe the migration patterns of blacks during the Great Migration by
using this classification is to state that blacks left Loving states and migrated
to 1948-1967 legalized, 19th century legalized, and Never illegal state groups.
Fryer (2007) provides a detailed review of interracial marriage trends
during the 20th century and evaluates the explanatory power of current theo-
ries of family formation. He finds that over the period of the Great Migration,
black male interracial marriage rates (IMRs hereafter) differed remarkably
among states that never had any anti-miscegenation laws, states that volun-
tarily repealed their anti-miscegenation laws either before or during the 19th
century, and states that were forced to strike down their statutes by the U.S.
Supreme Court. While Fryer briefly report different IMRs in different state
groups, the current study investigates possible causes of unequal IMRs among
state groups by focusing on the impact of interracial marriage, state of birth
and ban of anti-miscegenation laws on married black male migrants’ destina-
tion selection in the U.S.
The main question of interest is whether interracially married black
males sort themselves into four state groups of destination differently from
those who have non-black spouses and whether the anti-miscegenation laws in
their state of birth and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Loving
v. Virginia affected this sorting.
The harmony of relationships between races in a society like the U.S.
depends on the level and quality of interaction between different racial groups.
Interracial marriages constitute the most intimate type of interactions between
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races. Fryer (2007) shows that relationships between the different races and
IMRs in the U.S. are related to and affected by individual education, anti-
miscegenation laws, regions and states of residence, and military statuses of
individuals. This study tries to understand how anti-miscegenation laws dif-
ferentially affected the incentives to migrate and the geographical sorting of
inter- and intraracially married black males during the Great Migration.6
My calculations based on the 5 percent sample of Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the 1980 U.S. Census data reveal that
black male IMRs are highest in the 1948-1967 Legalized, lowest in the Loving
states and between these levels in the 19th Century legalized, and Never illegal
states. I use a multinomial probit model to investigate the relationship be-
tween interracial marriages, anti-miscegenation laws, and migration patterns
of married black males.
The results suggest that statutes banning interracial marriages had
an impact on the sorting of married black males into different state group
categories. Interracially married black males who were born in the Loving, 19th
Century legalized, and Never illegal states were less likely to reside in their
states of birth relative to residing in the 1948-1967 Legalized states than those
black males with black wives. This disproportional movement of interracially
married black males born in the Loving, 19th Century legalized, and Never
illegal states could have caused these high IMRs in 1948-1967 Legalized states.
6Intraracial marriages refer to those between two individuals of same race.
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However, the younger generation of Loving-born interracially married black
males who entered the marriage market after the anti-miscegenation laws were
struck down in 1967 are more likely to stay in their birth states than those
younger generation of Loving-born intraracially married black males.
3.1 Data Set and Black Male Interracial Marriage
I use the 5 percent sample of the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) based on the 1980 U.S. Census data (Ruggles et al. [2004]).
The 1980 Census data set is preferred because it is the most recent data set
that covers both the Great Migration and the post-1967 period, and because it
allows construction of a variable that determines the year of first marriage. The
variables age at first marriage, age in 1980, and times married are jointly used
to determine the exact year of first marriage. The use of these three variables
allows one to determine the incidence of all first marriages rather than the
prevalence of all marriages, first and subsequent combined, at the time of the
1980 Census enumeration. The IPUMS samples based on the 1940, 1960 and
1970 U.S. Census data also allow determination of the year of first marriage.
However, the 1980 sample is the most recent data set that covers the longest
period of time (13 years) after the U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down
anti-miscegenation laws.
The IPUMS Census data provide sufficient information to identify mar-
ried couples currently living in the same household. This information allows
one to match each married black male with his spouse’s characteristics, includ-
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ing race, and then to calculate the number of black males with black spouses,
white spouses and spouses of other races.7 The black male/white female In-
terracial Marriage Rate (IMR) for black males in their first marriages is the
ratio of black males with white spouses to the total number of married black
males.8 The black male/other race female IMR for black males in their first
marriages is defined similarly.
The sample is restricted to all U.S.-born black males aged 15-80 who
are in their first marriages.9 The sample consists of 137,117 black males in
their first marriages, who make up 79 percent of all married black males.
The 33,743 black males who have been married more than once are excluded
from the sample, because it is impossible to identify the year of their current
marriage or the race of their first wife.
The black male/white female interracial marriage is a rare event; the
IMR is 2.31 percent for the black males who were in their first marriages in
1980. Black male/other race female interracial marriage is even rarer; the
black male/other race female IMR is 0.66 percent for black males who were in
their first marriages in 1980 (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). Table 3.2 presents
black male/white female interracial marriage rates for black males in four state
7The other race category includes American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Asians, Pacific
Islanders and others.
8Here I focus on heterosexual marriages.
9The results are not affected when the sample is restricted to the black males aged 15-
60. Black female interracial marriages are excluded from the analysis, as the low IMR for
black female/white male (0.77 percent) and black female/other-race male (0.21 percent)
yield large standard errors and insignificant estimates.
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groups (Loving, 1948-1967 Legalized, 19th Century legalized and Never illegal
states) and by the different time periods these first marriages occurred. Black
male IMRs are calculated for the years before 1967, the years after 1967, and
for all marriages before 1980. Table 3.2, Column 1 shows the black male IMRs
for marriages that occurred before or in 1967. Column 2 shows the black male
IMRs for marriages that occurred after 1954 and before 1967. I calculate IMRs
from 1954 to 1967, “Before 2” period, which spans exactly 13 years, the same
number as the “After” period, to yield a comparable number of years following
the U.S. Supreme Court decision. The third and the fourth columns show the
IMRs for black males from 1967 until 1980 and for all years before 1980. For
instance, the first row and the first column of the upper panel of Table 3.2
gives the ratio of black males with white spouses to all black males in their
first marriages residing in Loving states and married before or in 1967.
The upper panel of Table 3.2 shows that the black male/white female
IMR among the residents of Loving states increased the most after 1967 com-
pared to those in the other state groups. In Loving states the IMRs increased
by 429 or 278 percent depending on the definition of the period before 1967.
While the percentage increase of IMR was highest in the Loving states, the
IMR in the Loving states never reached the levels of those in other state groups.
For example, the black male/white female IMR for post-1967 period is 1.85
in Loving states, while it is 8.82, 5.95 and 7.03 in the 1948-1967 legalized,
19th Century legalized and Never illegal states respectively. The fourth col-
umn shows that IMRs for the entire period are the lowest in the Loving states
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(1.01), highest in the 1948-1967 Legalized states (5.03), and fall between these
extremes in the 19th Century legalized (3.17) and Never illegal states (3.88).
The middle panel of Table 3.2 presents the black male IMRs grouped
by state of birth. A comparison of the fourth columns of the upper and
middle panels reveals that black male IMRs are larger (in every state group)
when individuals are grouped by their birth states rather than their states of
residence. Among the black males who were born in the Loving states the
overall IMR was 1.53, while for those residing in the Loving states in 1980, the
IMR rate was only 1.01.
The IMRs for the 89,008 married black males who were born in one of
the four state groups and resided in the same state group in 1980 are presented
in the bottom panel of Table 3.2. The fourth columns of all three panels of
Table 3.2 reveal that the IMRs are the lowest for black males residing in the
same state of birth.
The last row and the fourth column of each panel demonstrate that
the IMR for “stayer” black males is (1.77 percent) lower than the IMR for all
black males (2.31 percent). One implication of different IMRs is that the black
males who are not residents of the state group in which they were born have
different IMRs than those who are the residents of their state group of birth.
Therefore, interracially married black males are expected to be sorted differen-
tially in their states of residence than those with black wives. The next section
investigates the differential sorting patterns of married black males in their re-
spective states of residence by birth state, time of ban of anti-miscegenation
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laws in the birth state and interracial marriage.
Table 3.3 shows the black male/other race female IMRs for black males
by the four state groups previously defined and by the different time periods
these first marriages occurred. The IMRs reported in Table 3.3 are similar
in terms of relative magnitude, and as expected each cell is smaller than the
corresponding cell in Table 3.2.
3.2 Migration and Black Male Interracial Marriage
The previous literature on the Great Migration shows that from 1910 to
the 1970s, millions of blacks migrated from Southern states to the Northern,
Midwestern and Western states. This section investigates the role of anti-
miscegenation laws on married black males’ destination selections.
3.2.1 Empirical Model
To examine the role of the year anti-miscegenation laws were banned on
the sorting of inter- and intraracially married black males in destination states,
individuals are categorized into four different state groups, Never illegal, 19th
Century legalized, 1948-1967 Legalized, and Loving, by their birth states and
their states of residence.
While the state group of residence in the 1980 Census enumeration is
identified as the migration destination, some black males may have moved
within their state groups of birth, moved out of their state group of birth and
returned, or moved after collection of the Census data. Complete information
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on an individual’s migration history would be ideal, but using the state of
residence as the destination should not invalidate the results.
The destination choice equations for a black male i can be written as:




ij ×B′ij)+αj3X ′ij + εji > 0] j = 1, 2, 3, (3.1)
where Di1, Di2, and Di3 are indicator variables for three destination
state groups (or three state groups of residence): Loving, 19th Century legal-
ized, and Never illegal states (excluding the 1948-1967 Legalized group). The
Bij includes three indicator variables for the state group of birth: Loving, 19
th
Century legalized, and Never illegal. The IMij is a vector of indicator variables
for having a white wife or a wife of another race. The vector Xij includes age,
education and the interaction terms of variables Bij, IMij, and (IM
′
ij × B′ij)
with an indicator variable (Age≤31), which takes on a value of one if a black
male i is 31 years old or younger.
Individuals who were 31 or younger as of the 1980 Census enumeration
were 18 or younger in 1967, the year the anti-miscegenation laws of 16 Loving
states were struck down. My calculations based on the 1980 Census data
show that 92 percent of all black males in their first marriages married after
18. Given that the great majority of individuals marry after 18, a typical
black male who was 31 or younger (younger group hereafter) as of the 1980
Census enumeration experienced a marriage market free of the shadow of anti-
miscegenation laws. Therefore, I expect intra- and interracially married black
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males who were 31 or younger to have different destination sorting than those
intra- and interracially married black males who were older than 31 during the
1980 Census enumeration (older group hereafter).
The equations Dij for j = 1, 2, 3 can be estimated as a multinomial pro-
bit model, where Di1, Di2, and Di3 are destination state groups (Loving, 19
th
Century legalized, and Never illegal states respectively), compared to residing
in the 1948-1967 legalized state group during the 1980 Census enumeration.
A multinomial probit model is preferred because it does not require the re-
strictive zero-covariance assumption imposed by the multinomial logit model,
heavily based on the IIA assumption.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
The marginal effects after the multinomial probit estimation are pre-
sented in Table 3.4. They are evaluated at the sample mean relative to the
base outcome of residing in one of the 1948-1967 Legalized states. Table 3.4
shows that intraracially married Loving-born older generation black males are
53, 5, and 2 percentage points more likely to reside in the Loving, 19th Century
legalized or Never illegal states, respectively, than to reside in the 1948-1967
Legalized states, while Loving-born older black males with white or other-race
wives are 29 and 35 percentage points, respectively, less likely to reside in the
Loving states than to reside in the 1948-1967 Legalized states. For Loving-
born older generation black males, having a white or other-race wife does not
affect the likelihood of residing in 19th Century legalized or Never illegal states.
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One way to test the impact of the ban on anti-miscegenation laws in
1967 on black males’ choices of destination states is to focus on black males
who were likely to be in the marriage market after 1967. If the differential
sorting of interracially married black males into destination state groups is
independent of anti-miscegenation laws, then the younger generation of black
males who were in the marriage market after 1967 are expected to make similar
destination selections to the older generation of black males.
To test whether the generation of black males who were not constrained
by anti-miscegenation laws while in the marriage market sorted themselves
differently into destination state groups than those black males who were con-
strained by those laws I use triple differencing. I interact the indicator variable
for younger generation with birth state and the race of spouse, in other words
(Age≤31) is interacted with variables Bij, IMij, and (IM ′ij ×B′ij).
The first column of Table 3.4 demonstrates that, compared to the older
generation of intraracially married Loving-born black males, the intraracially
married younger black males who were born in Loving states are 7 percentage
points more likely to stay in the Loving states relative to residing in the 1948-
1967 Legalized states. This finding is consistent with the historical fact that
migration out of the Southern states slowed down or even reversed after 1970s.
Interestingly, the interracially married younger black males who were born in
Loving states are 15 percentage points more likely to reside in the Loving
states than are intraracially married younger black males. The coefficient
of [(Age≤31)×Other Race Wife×Born in Loving ] is positive and statistically
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significant at the 10 percent level.
This analysis shows that interracially married black males who are from
Loving states are less likely to stay in the Loving states than those Loving-
born black males with black wives. However, this result does not hold for
those black males who were likely to be in the marriage market when the
anti-miscegenation laws were no longer in effect.
When interpreting the results, a caveat is necessary about the direction
of causation between having a non-black wife and a black male’s choice of
destination state. The Census data do not allow determination of whether a
black male married before or after his migration, which prevents determination
of whether a black male married in his birth state or in the destination state.
Several scenarios may have led to the final distribution of black males
in the destination states. First, prior to 1967 black males who were born in the
Loving states could choose to relocate to the non-Loving states to marry their
existing non-black girlfriends. Second, black males who were born in the Loving
states could choose to relocate to the non-Loving states even in the post-1967
period because interracial marriage could be perceived as more of a taboo in
the Loving states even after these laws were struck down. These differences
in perception seem plausible, because the non-Loving states either did not
have any anti-miscegenation laws or voluntarily repealed those laws, while
the Loving states were forced to strike down their anti-miscegenation laws by
the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, black males who were born in the Loving
states could choose to emigrate for better social and economic opportunities
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and could legally marry a non-black in the destination state. The results
show that the interracially married older black males who were born in the
Loving states are less likely to reside in the Loving states, and the direction of
causation is irrelevant for the results.
While it is important to focus on the differential migration patterns of
Loving-born black males, one should also investigate non-Loving born black
males’ destination choices to see the whole picture of differential migration of
black males. Doing so would help one to understand the much larger IMRs
in the 1948-1967 Legalized states compared to other state groups as shown in
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
The probability of residing in the same state group of birth is 50 and 55
percentage points higher for intraracially married older black males who were
born in the 19th Century legalized and Never illegal states respectively. Quite
interestingly, older generation black males with white spouses who were born
either in the 19th Century legalized or Never illegal states are only 7 percentage
points less likely to reside in their states of birth compared to 29 percentage
points for Loving-born older black males with white spouses. This striking
result implies that not only Loving-born interracially married older generation
black males are more likely to reside in the 1948-1967 Legalized states, but also
that interracially married older generation black males from other state groups
are more likely to reside in 1948-1967 Legalized states. This disproportional
presence of interracially married black males in 1948-1967 Legalized states
explains the highest IMRs in 1948-1967 Legalized states (by current state of
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residence) in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
The younger generation Loving-born black males with white wives are
more likely to reside in their birth states compared to those younger generation
Loving-born black males with black wives. However, the younger black males
who were born in the 19th Century legalized or Never illegal states married to
other-race wives are 13 or 11 percentage points less likely to reside in the same
state than those intraracially married younger black males born in the same
state groups. Based on these results above, one can conclude that statutes
banning interracial marriages affected the sorting of the U.S. born black males
into different state group categories.
3.3 Conclusion
The emigration of Southern-born blacks during the Great Migration
affected the lives of millions of blacks and drastically changed the distribution
of black population in the U.S. Unsatisfied with economic, social and political
inequality in the South, educated and uneducated blacks alike joined in the
biggest migration of blacks in U.S. history. Racial inequality between blacks
and whites pervaded even the most intimate interactions, marriages. Anti-
miscegenation laws remained effective in 16 southern states until the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Loving v.Virginia in 1967 forced their ban.
This study investigates the different migration behavior of inter- and
intraracially married black males across four state groups. Nine states never
had such laws (Never illegal), 11 voluntarily repealed them in the 19th century
67
(19th Century legalized), another 14 voluntarily repealed in 1948-1967 period
(1948-1967 Legalized), and 16 Loving states repealed in 1967.
The results show that while Loving-born intraracially married black
males are more likely to reside in the Loving, 19th Century legalized or Never
illegal states, Loving-born interracially married black males are less likely to re-
side in the Loving states. Strikingly, among the younger generation of Loving-
born black males who experienced a marriage market free of anti-miscegenation
laws, the interracially married black males are more likely to reside in the Lov-
ing states than the intraracially married black males.
The finding that older generation interracially married black males are
more likely to reside in the 1948-1967 Legalized states is not limited to those
born in the Loving states. Older generation interracially married black males
from 19th Century legalized or Never illegal states are also more likely to reside
in 1948-1967 Legalized states. This disproportional presence of interracially
married black males in the 1948-1967 Legalized states may account for the
highest IMRs in 1948-1967 Legalized states.
When it comes to gauging the contributions of this study, it is important
to keep in mind the limitations of using Census data in migration research.
Ideally longitudinal data set with complete migration, dating and marriage
history of individuals would be preferred. Nonetheless, the information on
recent migrants from the IPUMS based on the U.S. Census data may provide
some insight to the results. Another limitation arising from the use of Census
data is that the inability to determine the order of migration and marriage
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decision may cause reverse causality. Again, I avoid making bold claims about
the direction of causation between marriage and migration and looking at the
differential sorting of younger and older generations would help to alleviate
these concerns.
Regardless of its potential shortcomings, this study shows that anti-
miscegenation laws and state of birth affected the sorting of inter- and in-
traracially married black males into destination state groups during the Great
Migration. The results presented here only explain a small part of the history
of anti-miscegenation laws, Great Migration, and interracial relations in the
U.S. Future work might involve examination of the role of distances traveled,
geographic variation in economic opportunities and variation in punishment
for the crime of interracial marriage prior to 1967. Further research on these
issues will expand our limited knowledge on the delicate history of interracial
relationships.
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Table 3.1: States Grouped by Their Bans of Anti-Miscegenation Laws
Loving states 1948-1967 19th Century Never illegal
Legalized legalized
Alabama California (1948) Illinois Alaska
Arkansas Oregon (1951) Iowa Connecticut
Delaware Montana (1952) Kansas Hawaii
Florida N. Dakota(1955) Maine Minnesota
Georgia Colorado (1957) Massachusetts New Hampshire
Kentucky S. Dakota(1957) Michigan New Jersey
Louisiana Idaho (1959) New Mexico New York
Mississippi Indiana (1959) Ohio Vermont
Missouri Nevada (1959) Pennsylvania Wisconsin
N. Carolina Arizona (1962) Rhode Island
Oklahoma Nebraska (1963) Washington





Source: Penalties are the most recent revisions of the laws in question by year 1951. Browning (1951) “Anti-
Miscegenation Laws in the United States” and Newbeck (2004) “Virginia Hasn’t Always Been for Lovers:
Interracial Marriage Bans and the Case of Richard and Mildred Loving”are the main sources. Fryer (2007)
classifies Kansas, New Mexico and Washington in the Never illegal group since these states repealed these
laws before 1900s and before statehood. Here I classify them in the 19th Century legalized group because
regardless of statehood, they repealed these laws before the 1900s.
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Table 3.2: Black Male/White Female Intermarriage Rates for Black Males in
Their First Marriages: Ages 15-80
Year of First Marriage=t
By State of Before 1 Before 2 After All AfterBefore1
After
Before2
Residence t≤1967 t ∈ (1954, 67) t>1967 t ≤ 1980 %∆ %∆
Loving states 0.35 0.49 1.85 1.01 429 278
1948-67 Legalized 1.85 2.74 8.82 5.03 377 222
19th C. legalized 1.22 1.86 5.95 3.17 388 220
Never illegal 1.79 1.93 7.03 3.88 293 264
All 0.90 1.29 4.16 2.31 362 222
By State of
Birth
Loving states 0.61 0.93 2.91 1.53 377 218
1948-67 Legalized 1.92 2.60 7.99 5.48 316 204
19th C. legalized 2.38 2.92 7.24 5.14 204 148
Never illegal 3.21 3.36 8.05 5.93 151 140
All 0.90 1.29 4.16 2.31 362 222
Same Current
& Birth State
Loving states 0.30 0.42 1.63 0.88 443 288
1948-67 Legalized 1.72 2.39 8.08 5.49 370 238
19th C. legalized 2.01 2.34 5.98 4.27 197 156
Never illegal 2.85 2.64 7.51 5.35 164 184
All 0.64 0.85 3.07 1.77 379 261
Source: 5% IPUMS, the 1980 U.S. Census data. The sample is restricted to all U.S.-born black males aged 15-80 in their
first marriages. Black-white interracial marriage rate for black males is the ratio of black males married to white women to
the ratio of all black married men in their first marriages. D.C. is excluded from the sample. The “After” period spans the
13 years from 1967 till 1980. The first of the two “Before” periods spans 53 years from 1913 to 1967, and the second one
spans 13 years from 1954 to 1967.
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Table 3.3: Black Male/Other-Race Female Intermarriage Rates for Black
Males in Their First Marriages: Ages 15-80
Year of First Marriage=t
By State of Before 1 Before 2 After All AfterBefore1
After
Before2
Residence t≤1967 t ∈ (1954, 67) t>1967 t ≤ 1980 %∆ %∆
Loving states 0.18 0.26 0.61 0.37 239 135
1948-67 Legalized 0.97 1.46 2.49 1.66 157 070
19th C. legalized 0.42 0.48 1.01 0.67 140 110
Never illegal 0.52 0.49 1.39 0.87 167 184
All 0.37 0.50 1.03 0.66 178 106
By State of
Loving states 0.31 0.44 0.80 0.51 158 082
1948-67 Legalized 0.55 0.79 2.26 1.55 311 186
19th C. legalized 0.71 0.73 1.34 1.07 089 084
Never illegal 0.90 0.88 1.71 1.36 090 094
All 0.37 0.50 1.03 0.66 178 106
Same Current
& Birth State
Loving states 0.17 0.23 0.50 0.31 194 117
1948-67 Legalized 0.56 0.80 2.05 1.44 266 156
19th C. legalized 0.52 0.45 0.80 0.68 054 078
Never illegal 0.87 0.88 1.18 1.03 036 034
All 0.25 0.32 0.69 0.46 176 116
Source: 5% IPUMS, the 1980 U.S. Census data. The sample is restricted to all U.S.-born black males aged 15-80 in their
first marriages. Black-Other Race Interracial marriage rate for black males defined is the ratio of black males married to
American Indian, Alaskan Native, Asian, Pacific Islander or other race spouses to the ratio of all black married men in their
first marriages. D.C. is excluded from the sample. The “After” period spans the 13 years from 1967 till 1980. The first of
the two “Before” periods spans 53 years from 1913 to 1967, and the second one spans 13 years from 1954 to 1967.
72
Table 3.4: Destination Choices of Black Males: Marginal Effects After
Multinomial Probit
Current State of Residence (Dependent variables)
Loving states 1948-1967 19th Century Never illegal
Independent variables Legalized legalized
Born in...
Loving states .526∗∗ −.604∗∗ .053∗∗ .024∗∗
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.005)
19th Century legalized −.274∗∗ −.163∗∗ .496∗∗ −.059∗∗
(.014) (.001) (.014) (.005)
Never Illegal −.277∗∗ −.147∗∗ −.125∗∗ .548∗∗
(.015) (.001) (.006) (.016)
White Wife −.052 −.012 −.009 .074
(.077) (.027) (.052) (.048)
White Wife×Born in...
Loving states −.289∗∗ .193∗∗ .084 .012
(.065) (.050) (.063) (.037)
19th Century legalized −.0005 .089+ −.074+ −.014
(.086) (.052) (.042) (.037)
Never illegal −.119 .153∗ .043 −.068∗∗
(.099) (.068) (.073) (.020)
(Age≤31) .082∗∗ .016+ −.021 −.077∗∗
(.020) (.008) (.015) (.010)
(Age≤31)×Born in...
Loving states .070∗∗ −.054∗∗ −.036∗ .020
(.020) (.007) (.015) (.015)
19th Century legalized −.053∗ −.029∗∗ .061∗∗ .022∗∗
(.025) (.009) (.020) (.017)
Never illegal .024 −.020 −.042∗ .038∗
(.027) (.012) (.019) (.018)
(Age≤31)×White Wife −.141 .012 .127 .002
(.096) (.038) (.085) (.049)
(Age≤31)×White Wife×Born in...
Loving states .148+ −.035 −.078 −.035
(.086) (.033) (.051) (.040)
19th Century legalized .125 −.015 −.088+ −.021
(.100) (.044) (.051) (.051)
Never illegal .057 −.025 −.032 .0004
(.122) (.046) (.080) (.058)
Predicted Probability .559 .127 .198 .115
χ2 (Pr>χ2) 48,095 (<.001)
Log Pseudolikelihood -121,555
Number of Observations 130,117
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Table 3.4: (continued)
Current State of Residence (Dependent variables)
Loving states 1948-1967 19th Century Never illegal
Independent variables Legalized legalized
Other Race Wife .104 −.056+ .0004 −.049
(.093) (.028) (.076) (.044)
Other Race Wife×Born in...
Loving states −.354∗∗ .320∗∗ −.013 .047
(.073) (.088) (.072) (.085)
19th Century legalized −.064 .147 −.120∗∗ .036
(.127) (.094) (.045) (.095)
Never illegal −.221 .256∗ −.026 −.008
(.142) (.125) (.098) (.072)
(Age≤31)×
Other Race Wife −.295∗ .005 −.015 .305+
(.129) (.064) (.106) (.168)
(Age≤31)×Other Race Wife×Born in...
Loving states .177 −.036 −.054 −.087∗∗
(.127) (.053) (.096) (.030)
19th Century legalized .264∗ −.036 −.135∗ −.093∗∗
(.112) (.066) (.057) (.028)
Never illegal .245 −.084+ −.049 −.112∗∗
(.151) (.043) (.134) (.006)
Age −.004∗∗ .0008∗∗ .002∗∗ .0004∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Education −.023∗∗ .011∗∗ .007∗∗ .004∗∗
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0002)
Predicted Probability .559 .127 .198 .115
χ2 (Pr>χ2) 48,095 (<.001)
Log Pseudolikelihood -121,555
Number of Observations 130,117
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance
matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The
group of black males who were born in 1948-1967 Legalized states is the reference category in birth state group. Black males
married to black spouses make up the reference category in the spousal race group. The results reported for the multinomial
probit estimations are marginal effects rather than coefficients.
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Human Capital and Black-White Interracial
Marriage
This study focuses on interracial marriages between non-Hispanic blacks
and whites in the U.S. to answer the following questions: (1) How does human
capital affect interracial marriage decisions? (2) How do different distributions
of educational attainment by blacks and whites affect the Interracial Marriage
Probability (IMP) for black males? (3)What are the implications of increasing
individual educational attainment on this probability?
Existing studies focus mainly on the determinants of black-white mar-
riages. One line of research aims to understand distinctive patterns of black-
white marriages in the U.S. [Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan (1990), Qian (1997),
and Model and Fisher (1992)]. Their main result is that black males are more
likely to be married outside of their race than are black females.1 The black
male (female) Interracial Marriage Rate (IMR or the Exogamy rate) is the ra-
tio of black males (females) with white spouses to the total number of married
black males (females).2
1Merton (1941) explains the higher IMR for black males with his status exchange theory.
Gullickson (2005) compares current theories on educational characteristics of interracially
married black-white couples and finds partial support for this status exchange theory.
2The focus will be on heterosexual marriages.
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Figure 4.1 plots IMRs for black males and black females for the period
1962-2005. IMR calculations are based on prevalence rather than incidence of
these marriages, since it is impossible to identify the year of marriage from the
Census data.3 Figure 4.1 shows that while the black male and the black female
IMRs were almost the same in 1962, the black male IMR has been much larger
than the black female IMR in all subsequent years. The IMRs for both black
males and black females have steadily increased from 1962 to 2005.4 In 1962
only 0.7 percent of the married black males had white spouses, while in 2005,
6.64 percent had white spouses. Although this IMR is low, it has risen 9.5-fold
since 1962. Compared to black males, the black female IMR is much lower,
3.2 percent in 2005. Nevertheless, the black female IMR has increased more
than five-fold since 1962.5
In Figure 4.1, the black male (female) IMR is calculated as the ratio of
black males (females) with white spouses to all married black males (females).
Charles and Ming (2006) find that high incarceration rates for black males
limit their availability for marriage by different amounts in different marriage
markets. The black male marriage rate has decreased due to high incarceration
rates; therefore, even if equal numbers of black males marry white females, the
3The 2000 Census data is considered, and it does not provide details regarding the year
of marriage.
41962-2005 CPS March Supplements data are used. Because individuals with Hispanic
origin cannot be identified for 10 years in CPS, the black male group includes both hispanics
and non-hispanics. Based on the 2000 Census data summary file 1, I calculate that hispanics
constitute a small group in the overall black population. Only 2.4 percent of blacks are
Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau [2000]).
5The IMR for black females in 1962 was around 0.6 percent.
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dramatic increase in black male IMR can be explained on this basis.
Figure 4.2 plots IMRs for black males and black females using an alter-
native definition for IMR, the ratio of the number of black males with white
spouses to all black males. The IMR for black males under this definition
points to a six-fold increase from 1962 to 2005 (0.4 percent in 1962 to 2.4
percent in 2005). For black females this IMR definition amounts a three-fold
increase (0.3 percent in 1962 to 0.9 percent in 2005). Regardless of the IMR
definition used, the data reflect a trend toward increasing frequency of black-
white interracial marriages.
I consider education (proxied by years of schooling) rather than indi-
vidual earnings as a determinant of IMP for two reasons. First, individual
education has a large predictive effect on future earning ability. Many peo-
ple marry young, and they do not observe the future earnings of a potential
spouse; rather they form expectations based on education and other unobserv-
ables. Second, Wong (2003a, 2003b) finds that education is a more desirable
spousal feature than earnings for black males, while earnings are more desir-
able for white males.6
To understand the ways through which education may affect IMP, I
borrow Furtado’s (2006) classification of mechanisms through which human
capital may affect interethnic marriages between immigrants and natives in
the U.S. Human capital may affect the decision to marry interracially through
6Wong (2003a, 2003b) uses a structural matching model that allows for marital sorting
and utilizes individual preferences.
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two mechanisms.7 The first asserts that an increase in individual education
may directly increase the IMP due to exposure to more diverse environments.
I call this the racial adaptability effect. According to the racial adaptability
effect, the IMP is expected to be higher for more educated people, since they
are expected to be more comfortable sharing a household with someone of a
different race. Demo and Hughes (1990) find that interracial interactions dur-
ing childhood and adolescence, and higher socioeconomic status have negative
impacts on in-group attachment for blacks. In addition to this, Schuman et
al. (1997) find that interracial marriages and opposition to anti-miscegenation
laws relate positively to education level among whites. These two studies
affirm that education may change both blacks’ and whites’ perceptions and
attitudes towards other races.
The second mechanism that may affect IMP is the assortative mating
effect. This effect predicts that if an individual prefers a highly educated
spouse of the same race, s/he may be willing to give up racial similarities
for similarities in education. For instance, in the case of a highly educated
black male, if it is less likely for him to find a highly educated black spouse
than to find a highly educated white spouse, he may be willing to marry
a highly educated white female. The assortative mating effect of education
states that as individual educational level increases, exogamy should increase
for members of groups with lower average education, controlling for dispersion
7Furtado (2006) mentions three mechanisms. See Furtado for the full classification.
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of educational attainment.8
In the interethnic marriage context, Furtado (2006) focuses on effects
of different educational distributions of immigrants of different ethnicities in
the U.S. and their interethnic marriage probabilities. Furtado (2006) uses a
simple one-sided matching model and incorporates a positive premium that
depends negatively on individual education in the utility function if an im-
migrant marries someone of the same ethnicity. The theoretical part of the
current study builds on a two-sided matching model with inter- and intra-
group heterogeneity. The model falls in the class of long-term partnership
formation in the matching literature [Burdett and Coles (1997), (1999)]. How-
ever, this model introduces (1) within- and between-group heterogeneity in
education, and (2) a distaste factor for a spouse of another race. This model
follows Wong’s (2003a), which incorporates a constant marriage taboo in a
two-sided matching model to explain very low black male interracial marriage
rates.9 Unlike Wong, I assume that distaste for a partner of another race is
not constant, but rather it is a function of individual education.
I seek to understand the relative importance of the mechanisms through
which human capital may affect black-white interracial marriages.10 Even
8This statement is based on the assumption that average education summarizes the
different educational distributions in this context.
9Wong’s structural estimation results show that if there were no mating taboo for different
race spouses, the 5.5 percent black male interracial marriage rate in 1990 would be 64
percent, still much lower than random intermarriage rate which would be 85.4 percent in
the 1990 Census. The random intermarriage rate (the encounter rate) would prevail in the
absence of selection or friction in the marriage market.
10Intraracial marriage and endogamous marriage are used interchangeably; likewise inter-
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though various aspects of black-white interracial marriages have been investi-
gated before, the connection between education, the decision to marry someone
of another race, and the role of different geographical educational distributions
of races has never been modeled and empirically examined. An important con-
tribution of this study is that it examines the geographical variation of black
and white educational distributions to understand the role of education in the
black male IMP. I find that individual education plays important role in the
IMP for a black male. However, when the education distributions of blacks
and whites are considered, the direct effect of individual education becomes
insignificant in explaining the IMP.
4.1 Data Set
I use the 5 percent sample of Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) of the 2000 U.S. Census Data. The sample is restricted to non-
Hispanic blacks and whites who are between the ages of 25 and 54. The
married group is identified as married individuals currently living with their
spouses. Endogamous marriage refers to heterosexual marriages within a race,
and exogamous marriage in this context refers to heterosexual marriages be-
tween blacks and whites.
Defining a marriage market is a very hard task. The proper defini-
tion should focus on one’s social network, but the Census data do not pro-
racial marriage and exogamous marriage are used synonymously.
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vide sufficient information to identify social networks. This study defines a
marriage market as the metropolitan area where a person lives.11 Previous
research shows that metropolitan areas approximate marriage markets well.12
I consider assortative mating with respect to race and gender in the case of
metropolitan areas. One should be cautious about using any variable that
considers variation based on metropolitan areas. This is because, in the 5
percent sample of 2000 IPUMS data, 35 U.S. metropolitan areas were incom-
pletely identified by more than 10 percent.13 The main results of this study
are robust to changes in the sample size when these 35 metropolitan areas are
dropped. The metropolitan areas with fewer than 50 people in any gender-
race group are dropped from the analysis, because their inclusion may cause
imprecision in the variables that capture the educational distributions.
Table 4.1 shows the average education of interracially and intraracially
married black males, black females and their spouses. The education gap
between inter- and intraracially married black males is less than six months
(0.45 years). On average, black males with white spouses are more educated
than those with black spouses. Furthermore, the education gap between black
males and their white spouses is less than the education gap between black
males and their black spouses.
11I also considered alternative definitions of the marriage market to establish the robust-
ness of the results. These include state of residence and birth state.




4.2 Theory: A Two-Sided Matching Model
This section introduces a spousal search model to understand how hu-
man capital may affect the probability of black-white interracial marriages.
The model used here follows Wong (2003a), but it builds on the role of individ-
ual traits in the discounting of interracial marriage output. As an individual’s
education increases, one expects the probability of exogamy to increase. This
is due to a greater exposure to a more diverse environment, which this study
calls the racial adaptability effect. The second one is the assortative mating
effect, which takes the differences in the education distributions of the two
racial groups into consideration.
Preference for a highly educated spouse who is of the same race is in-
corporated in the model, and the utility function reflects this trade-off. The
assortative mating effect of education implies that, as the education of an in-
dividual increases, the probability of exogamy increases if he is from a racial
group with a lower mean education, controlling for education standard devia-
tions. This effect translates into an interesting result: if the spatial distribution
of educational attainment varies between racial groups, the exogamy rates of
highly educated black males should be higher for a metropolitan area having
a higher white-black education gap.
4.2.1 Environment
Assumptions include a constant population with total mass equal to
one, with agents either married or single with a common discount rate of
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β > 0. There are two different race groups, r = b, w (blacks and whites). The
population of races is exogenous, and there are α blacks and (1−α) whites. The
proportion of single blacks to all singles is π, which is endogenously determined
at equilibrium. The fraction of people belonging to race r, who are single, is
pr. Therefore, π = α.pb/[α.pb + (1− α).pw].
Agents care about the race and the education level of a prospective
spouse. Abi/Abj stands for the education level of a black male/female, and
Awi/Awj is the education level of a white male/female.
14 Intra-group hetero-
geneity is assumed, hence agents in any racial group are ex ante different. The
education of a male of race r is Ari ∈ [Ar, Ar], for all r. When single, Zri = Ari
is an agent’s utility that depends on individual education level. If the agent
is married to someone of the same race, instantaneous utility is assumed to
be an equal split of match production, which is the product of the education
levels, Zri = (AriAr′j)/2, for r = r
′. Furthermore, if the agent is married to





if r 6= r′.15
An equal split of marriage output is assumed. θ(Ari) captures the
distaste for marrying someone of another race. This is a function of the edu-
14The subscript i stands for male and j is for female.
15For individuals to have an incentive to marry within their race, the incentive compati-
bility condition Ari ≤ AriAr′j2 , for r = r′, should be satisfied. The spousal education levels





2 , for r 6= r′. Hence, the minimum acceptable level of education for a
spouse of other race should be 2 + θ(Ari) ≤ Ar′j .
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cation level of an individual.16 The racial adaptability effect operates through
the distaste function. I incorporate the racial adaptability by assuming that
dθ(Ari)/dAri < 0, for all r. The interracial marriage output is discounted less
heavily as individual education level of the agent increases. Quite intuitively,
as one gets more education, his/her distaste for interracial marriage decreases.
Fb(.|A) is the distribution of education among single blacks, who will
propose to a potential spouse of type A if they meet. Fw(.|A) is the distribution
of education among single whites who will propose to a potential spouse of type
A if they meet. Further, the theoretical model assumes identical distributions
for people of the same race: Fbi(.|A) = Fbj(.|A) and Fwi(.|A) = Fwj(.|A).17
The distribution of education among all single people of race r = b, w is Hr(.),
where Hr(A) is the probability of a single of race r having, at most, A years
of education. Hr(A) and Fr(.|A) are not necessarily identical.
4.2.2 Matching
Singles look for spouses. Blacks and whites have the same likelihood
of meeting others. The arrival rate of opposite-sex singles is λ.18 The model
has the property of constant returns to matching function.19 When two agents
16The implications of the model and the analytical solution do not change if θ(Ari) is
assumed to be a positive gain to endogamous marriages rather than a racial distaste factor
for interracial marriages.
17This is not a crucial assumption, but it is made to keep the model tractable. In the
empirical section this assumption is relaxed.
18λ is independent of race and the number of participating singles.
19This assumption is important for the tractability of the model. It is not an unrealistic
assumption, since the arrival rate of singles does not necessarily correspond to the proportion
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meet, they observe each other’s races and types. If they both propose, they
form a match and leave the marriage market. If one of them does not propose,
they go back to the marriage market. All marriages are destroyed at rate
δ.20 The exogenous separation rate assumption keeps the model tractable and
realistic compared to the clone assumption.21 The value of being single for a
black male i, of type Abi is V (Abi).
22
βV (Abi) = Abi + λπEmax
{
K(Abi, zb), V (Abi)
}
+
λ(1− π)Emax{K(Abi, zw), V (Abi)
}− λV (Abi)
(4.1)
K(Abi, zb) is the type Abi black male’s ex ante expected discounted value
of being married to a black spouse of type zb ∼ Fb(.|Abi). Similarly, K(Abi, zw)
is Abi’s ex ante expected discounted value of being married to a white spouse
of type zw ∼ Fw(.|Abi). The ex post or realized values of endogamous and
of all singles in the population, but instead to the total number of singles one can meet in
a given period.
20Different separation rates for endogamous and exogamous marriages could be assumed,
but the main results are not affected. I make a common separation rate assumption.
21The clone assumption asserts that married couples leave the market and they are re-
placed by their identicals.
22The value of being single equals the instantaneous gain from being single, and the
difference between the expected discounted value of being married to a black or a white,
respectively.
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Due to different returns to intra- and interracial marriages, agents have
different reservation types for different races. A black male’s (Abi) reserva-
tion type for a black spouse is Rbi = Rbi(Abi) and for a white spouse is
R′bi = R
′
bi(Abi). Equalizing intra- and interracial marriage outputs will give the
relationship R′bi = Rbi + θ(Abi).
24 The racial distaste factor makes the reser-
vation type for a spouse of another race larger than the reservation type for
a same-race spouse. The racial distaste factor θ(Abi) decreases as individual
education increases.
The acceptance set of a black male for a black female (Abj) is, Abbi =
{j|Abj ≥ Rbi}, whereas, for a white female it is Abwi = {j|Awj ≥ R′bi}. While
the reservation types give the minimum acceptable human capital levels for
a spouse, the maximum attainable types are determined in equilibrium with
the most desirable type of female who proposes. Equalizing the value of being
single and the value of being married, one can get the optimal reservation
spouse type:25
23They correspond to the instantaneous gains from a marriage and the differences between





2 will give Awj − Abj = θ(Abi), and as a result, one can get
R′(Abi)−R(Abj) = θ(Abi).
25The reservation function is calculated as a fixed point of a contraction map.
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πK(Abi, Rbi) + (1− π)K(Abi, R′bi) = V (Abi). (4.4)
Substituting equation (4.2) and (4.3) in (4.4) gives:
AbiRbi
2
= βV (Abi). (4.5)























See Appendix B for the definition of the steady state Nash equilibrium.
4.2.3 Racial Adaptability Effect of Education
Higher education institutions are among the major marriage markets,
and they offer diverse environments. The racial adaptability effect states as
educational level increases, the individual is exposed to a more diverse en-
vironment, and thus the distaste for a spouse of another race is expected
to decrease. The racial adaptability effect works through the distaste factor
and reservation types. The model implies that additional education will (1)
increase the reservation type for the same race and (2) more importantly, de-
crease the reservation type for a spouse of another race. The next propositions




> 0. As individual education increases, the reser-
vation type for a same-race spouse increases, and the acceptance set for a
same-race spouse shrinks (see Appendix B for the proof).
The following proposition builds a connection between an individual’s




< 0 < dRbi
dAbi
always holds true (see Appendix B for
the proof).
Proposition 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 together imply that increasing one’s own
education causes the acceptance set to shrink from below for a same-race
spouse. Furthermore, the rate at which a potential white wife is accepted
increases with individual education. As a result, for a black male, the pace
at which a potential white wife is accepted increases, while it decreases for a
potential black wife, as individual education increases.
Proposition 4.2.3. dPr(IMP )
dAbi
> 0 always holds true (see Appendix B for the
proof).
The interracial marriage probability of a black male can be written as:
Pr(IMP ) =
(1− π∗) ∫ Awj
R′bi
dFw(z|Abi)







The above equation represents the probability of interracial marriage of a black
male. As an agent’s educational level increases, the reservation type (minimum
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acceptable level of spousal education) for a person of same race increases and
the reservation type for a person of another race decreases. The lower limit of
the integral of the second term in the denominator increases, whereas the lower
limits of the first terms of the denominator and the numerator decrease. As a
result, the probability of exogamy of a black male increases with education.
Propositions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 have implications for reservation types.
Also, Proposition 4.2.3 states that as one’s education increases, the IMP in-
creases. Even though everybody prefers a highly educated spouse, due to the
symmetric nature of the problem, a highly educated spouse may not be at-
tainable for people with fewer years of education, since they are less likely to
be in the acceptance set of a highly educated potential spouse.
4.2.4 Assortative Mating Effect of Education
Non-identical black and white education distributions may affect the
black-white IMPs. Assuming that individuals prefer to marry a highly edu-
cated spouse, if they are less likely to find such a spouse within their race,
then they may choose to marry someone with high education over marrying
someone of their same race.
The discount factor, θ(Abi), is the way in which the racial adaptability
effect works. An increase in individual education lowers the reservation type
for a spouse of another race and causes the IMP to increase. In order to see the
effect of different black-white education distributions on interracial marriages,
I assume that θ(Abi) = 0. The assumption is important, since in the presence
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of the discount factor it is hard to distinguish between the effects of different
education distributions and the effect of the distaste for a spouse of another
race on IMP. This assumption implies that reservation types for same race and
other race spouses are identical: Rbi = R
′
bi.
The education levels are normally distributed for both blacks and whites:
Ab• ∼ N(µb, σ2b ) and Aw• ∼ N(µw, σ2w).26 I also assume that the black educa-
tion mean is, strictly, less than the white education mean (µb < µw), but they




The next proposition states that due to non-identical education distri-
butions, and given that the racial adaptability effect is shut down, the assor-
tative mating effect implies that the probability of exogamy should be greater
for a black man with a higher level of education.
Proposition 4.2.4. Given θ(Abi) = 0, and there exists A
∗
bi, such that Ab <
Rbi(A
∗
bi) ≤ κ (where κ = µb+µw2 ); the probability of exogamy increases with
individual education dPr(IMP )
dAbi
> 0. (See Appendix B for the proof.)
This proposition has important implications for the effect of a varying
mean education gap between blacks and whites. Figure 4.3 is based on Furtado
(2006). Here, given Abi, if the reservation type, Rb(Abi), is in some defined
interval initially, as the mean education gap between whites and blacks (µw −
26Normal distribution is assumed to simplify the exposition.
27This assumption reflects the current situation in the U.S., but it will be relaxed in the
empirical section. Calculations based on the Census data show that σ̂w = 2.64, σ̂b = 2.47,
µ̂w = 14.04 and µ̂b = 12.92.
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µb) gets smaller - the black education distribution becomes similar to the white
education distribution - the exogamy probability will decrease with individual
education. Therefore, as a black male’s education level increases, the exogamy
probability becomes higher in a city where the average education gap is larger.
Given a mean education gap between whites and blacks in a geographical area,
as an individual from the lower mean education group (blacks) gets more
education, his IMP increases.
4.3 Empirical Model
4.3.1 Racial Adaptability v. Assortative Mating Effect
This section presents various specifications to test the empirical impli-
cations of the theoretical model. Here the focus is only on black male/white
female marriages.28 The racial adaptability effect can be captured by mea-
suring the marginal effect of education (in years) on IMP. The IMP is an
indicator variable that takes on value one if a black male is married to a white
female. Racial adaptability is present if the coefficient of the years of education
variable is positive and statistically significant. The assortative mating effect
takes the education distributions of blacks and whites into account, while the
racial adaptability effect only focuses on individual education. If the assorta-
tive mating effect matters, the mean educational levels and education standard
deviations of different races should matter.
28Black female/white male marriages are excluded from the analysis, as the low IMR for
black females (around 2% in 2000) may cause insignificant estimates.
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The implications of the assortative mating effect are tested by including
variables that can capture the education distributions of blacks and whites.
The variable set includes education means and standard deviations for blacks
and whites, and the mean education gap and its interaction with individual
education. If the coefficients of the variables defining the education distribu-
tions are significant, while the coefficient of individual education no longer is,
then one can conclude that racial adaptability is dominated by the assortative
mating effect.
To understand the relative importance of these effects I estimate various
versions of the following model:
IMPbij = 1[ψedubij + φ1edubj + φ2(edubj × edubij) + θ1eduwj+
θ2(eduwj × edubij) + γ1σbj + γ2σwj + Xbijβ + εbij > 0]
(4.7)
The educational level of a black male who resides in metropolitan area
j, is given by edubij. The variables, edubj and eduwj, are the mean educational
attainments, and σbj and σwj are the standard deviations of blacks’ and whites’
education respectively (in j). I also include the interaction terms of edubij with
edubj and eduwj. Finally, Xbij is a vector of variables that includes age, sex
ratios, three indicator variables for region of residence, total population and
population by gender and race in the metropolitan area.29
Table 4.2 shows the marginal effects evaluated at the sample averages
29The West is the excluded region.
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after estimating four versions of equation (4.7). While the first two columns
of Table 4.2 show the racial adaptability effect in isolation, the third and the
fourth columns introduce the assortative mating effect of education. In addi-
tion to these variables, starting with the second specification, the education
standard deviations, population variables, the number of available black males
and females, and four different measures of sex ratios in metropolitan areas
are added to the model.30 The third specification adds mean education for
blacks and whites and their interactions with edubij to the regressor set of
the second specification. Finally, the fourth specification augments the second
one with the white-black mean educational gap by metropolitan areas and its
interaction with an individual’s education.
The first column of Table 4.2 implies that, as the educational attain-
ment of an average black male with approximately 13.3 years of education
increases by one year, the IMP increases by almost 0.4 percentage points.
This effect is substantial given the 6.6 percent IMP for black males. With-
out controlling for education distributions, I cannot reject the presence of the
racial adaptability effect of education on a black male’s IMP. As expected, age
has a negative and the quadratic of age a positive coefficient. Compared to
the West, exogamy is less likely in the Northeast and the Midwest, and it is
least likely in the South.31
30The “available individuals” are defined as those who are not currently married. The
black male/black female, the black male/white female, the white male/black female, and
the white male/white female sex ratios are calculated for each metropolitan area.
31This may be due to historical reasons. Gevrek (2008) shows that in the 16 southern
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The second specification shows that even after controlling for the stan-
dard deviations of education and population characteristics of metropolitan
areas, individual education has a positive coefficient that is highly statistically
significant. The standard deviations of education for blacks and whites are not
statistically significant, and they also do not affect the coefficient of individual
education. The IMP for a black male is lower in bigger cities. For instance,
if the total population in an average metropolitan area increases by 100,000,
the IMP decreases by approximately 6 percentage points. A marginal rise in
the total black male population or a marginal drop in the total black female
population increases the black male IMP by the same magnitude, for an av-
erage black male. The coefficient of the black male/black female sex ratio is
not statistically significant. On the other hand, the black male/white female,
the white male/black female, and the white male/white female sex ratios have
significant coefficients.
In the third column of Table 4.2, the coefficient of education becomes
statistically insignificant. Therefore, individual education does not directly af-
fect the IMP; rather, it works through its interaction with the mean education
of blacks and whites in a metropolitan area. The effect of individual education
on the IMP is −.0033 + (−.0031 × edubj) + (.0032 × eduwj). As an average
black male’s education increases by one year, an increase in the mean black
states where anti-miscegenation laws were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967,
the IMR has always been lower than in those states where (1) interracial marriage was never
illegal or (2) it was legalized before the Supreme Court decision. See Fryer (2007) for the
careful analysis of the trends in interracial marriage during the 20th century.
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education in his metropolitan area will decrease his IMP by 0.31 percentage
points. Conversely, for an average black male, an additional year of education
coupled with an increase in the mean white education will increase his IMP
by almost the same magnitude, i.e., 0.32 percentage points.
Figure 4.4 plots the education distributions of blacks and whites in
two metropolitan areas. The highest mean educational gap between whites
and blacks in the U.S. is in the Bryan-College Station, TX metropolitan area.
Here the mean black education is 12.07 years and the mean white education is
14.87 years - a gap of 2.80 years. In this metropolitan area, if an average black
male with a high school diploma acquires an additional year of education, his
IMP increases by 0.7 percentage points. In contrast, the Bloomington-Normal,
IL metropolitan area has the lowest educational gap in the U.S. Here the mean
black education is 14.11 years and the mean white education is 14.13 years - a
gap of 0.02 years. An additional year of education for an average black male in
Bloomington-Normal, IL, decreases his IMP by 0.2 percentage points. These
calculations reveal that an increase in the educational level of a black male
will not always cause an increase his IMP due to the varying black and white
education distributions.
The impact of a marginal increase in mean black education on the IMP
depends negatively on a black male’s education level: .0538+(−.0031×edubij).
Similarly, the effect of a marginal increase in mean white education on a black
male’s IMP depends positively on a black male’s education level: −.0332 +
(.0032×edubij). The standard deviation of white education has a negative and
96
highly significant coefficient. In a metropolitan area with higher inequality of
education among whites, the exogamy probability of a black male is higher.
It is unclear whether this negative coefficient is due to a higher inequality in
the education of white males or white females.
Given the significant coefficients on mean educational attainment and
on the interaction terms, one expects that the mean educational gap between
whites and blacks might be important in determining exogamy rates for black
males. Whites in metropolitan areas have a higher mean education than blacks
in an average of 99.85 percent of the observations. Instead of including the
black and white education means separately, I simply include the mean edu-
cational gap. In Column 4, (eduwj − edubj)× edubij has a highly statistically
significant coefficient of 0.0032. Thus, given a positive mean educational gap,
an additional year of education that an average black male attains will increase
his exogamy probability by (−.0004+.0032×(eduwj−edubj)) percentage points.
For instance, as an average black male gets one additional year of education,
his IMP will increase by 0.86 percentage points in Bryan-College Station, TX,
whereas, an observationally equivalent black male’s IMP will decrease by 0.034
percentage points in Bloomington-Normal, IL.
The effect of a marginal increase in the mean educational gap on IMP
depends positively on the educational level of a black male: −.0357+(.0032×
edubij). The greater the positive average educational gap between whites and
blacks, the higher the IMP of a black male with additional years of education.
This empirical finding is consistent with the model, which highlights the fact
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that in areas with low average educational gaps, blacks and whites are more
similar in terms of education. The effect of an increase in a black male’s edu-
cation will not be as high, because the likelihood of his finding a educationally
similar black wife is greater.
The results in Table 4.2 show that the education distributions of two
groups, blacks and whites, play an important role in a black male’s IMP.
Consider a distinction between gender and race that creates four different
groups: black males, black females, white males and white females. In this
case, I estimate the following equation.
IMPbij = 1[Xbijβ + ψedubij + φ11edubmj + φ21edubfj + θ11eduwmj+
θ21eduwfj + φ12(edubmj · edubij) + φ22(edubfj · edubij)+
θ12(eduwmj · edubij) + θ22(eduwfj · edubij) + γ11σbmj+
γ12σbfj + γ21σwmj + γ22σwfj + εbij > 0]
(4.8)
The dependent variable and edubij are defined identically. The mean
educational attainments for black males (bm), black females (bf), white males
(wm) and white females (wf) are edubmj, edubfj, eduwmj and eduwfj respec-
tively. The standard deviations are defined similarly, where σbmj, σbfj, σwmj
and σwfj are the education standard deviations of bm, bf, wm and wf respec-
tively, in metropolitan area j. The rest of the variables in equation (4.8) are
defined the same way.
Table 4.3 shows the estimation results based on this gender-race classi-
fication. The first column in Table 4.3 corresponds to the second specification
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in Table 4.2. The coefficient of individual education is identical to that of
Table 4.2, even after controlling for standard deviations of educational levels
of bm, bf, wm and wf. In all specifications the coefficient of σbmj is negative
and statistically significant. As educational inequality among black males in-
creases, the IMP for a black male decreases. The coefficients of the bf, wm
and wf standard deviations are generally not statistically significant.
As in the previous case, once the variables accounting for mean educa-
tion for race-gender categories are included, the coefficient of individual educa-
tion becomes insignificant. The second column reveals two important results.
First, as the mean black male education increases by one year, the IMP for an
average black male increases almost by 5 percentage points (.0494 + .0005 ×
edubij). Second, when an average black male adds one more year to his educa-
tion, his IMP depends on the bm and wf mean education levels positively; and
it depends on the mean education of wm and bf negatively: −.0017+(.0005×
edubmj) + (−.0039∗∗ × edubfj) + (−.0044× eduwmj) + (.0079∗∗ × eduwfj). The
positive coefficient of the mean of wf education is almost twice as large as the
negative coefficient of the mean of bf education.
The remaining three specifications include variables for the mean ed-
ucational gap between various gender-race groups and their interactions with
individual education. The coefficient of the variable (eduwfj−edubfj)×edubij is
positive, and is the only significant educational gap coefficient in all three spec-
ifications. An increase in education level alone does not directly affect the IMP;
rather, its effect depends on the mean educational gaps. If an average black
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male gets an additional year of education, his IMP will positively depend on the
wf-bf educational gap; and it will negatively depend on the wm-bm educational
gap: .0004+.0050∗∗×(eduwfj−edubfj)−.0013×(eduwmj−edubmj). The fourth
specification suggests that the wf-bf educational gap, (eduwfj − edubfj) has a
negative coefficient, while the bm-bf educational gap, (edubmj − edubfj) has a
positive coefficient on black male IMP. In specification 5, (edubmj − eduwfj)
has a positive and marginally significant coefficient.
4.3.2 Robustness Tests
In this section, I provide different tests to see if the results are sensitive
to the following: the definition of the marriage market, the assumption of
assortative mating based on age groups, different sample sizes and the possible
endogenous decision of moving into metropolitan areas. The Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)-USA warns users that some metropolitan areas
are only partially identified in some Census years, including 2000. Table C.1
and Table C.2 replicate Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 respectively by omitting the
metropolitan areas that are incompletely identified by more than 10 percent.32
When these metropolitan areas are omitted, 5,439 and 5,427 observations are
lost from the samples. Table C.1 and Table C.2 reveal that the main results
are not affected if these metropolitan areas are excluded.
To see if the results are robust to the definition of the marriage market,
I replicate Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 by assuming that the marriage market
32See Appendix C for Table C.1 and Table C.2.
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is the current state of residence.33 In this case, I calculate the education
distribution variables for three different age groups: 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54.
The introduction of assortative mating by age implies that the variations in
variables that define education distributions arise from race, age, and state
in Table C.3. In Table C.4, on the other hand, the variation arises from
differences in race, age, state as well as in gender. The results in Table 4.2 are
robust to this change in the definition of the marriage market and assortative
mating with respect to age. The coefficients of the main variables of interest
are quantitatively similar, although generally slightly larger in absolute value.
Table C.4 shows that the impact of the bm-wm mean educational gap
on the black male IMP becomes significant, while the effect of the wf-bf educa-
tion gap on black males’ IMP is no longer significant. Although a state is not
the best approximation to a marriage market, this exercise in Table C.3 shows
that the results of Table 4.2 are almost unaffected. However, I get somewhat
different results in Table C.4 (in which the variation arises from race, age,
state, and gender) than in Table 4.3.
If highly educated interracially married black males tend to move to
metropolitan areas with high average educational gaps, this endogenous mov-
ing may cause the higher IMRs in these areas. Calculating education distri-
butions and sex ratios by using metropolitan areas of residence may cause
endogeneity (see Angrist [2002]). The issue is addressed by re-estimating the
33See Appendix C for Table C.3 and Table C.4.
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specifications of Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 using education distribution variables
based on birth states. In Table C.5, variations in education distributions arise
from race-age-birth state differences, while in Table C.6, variations arise from
race-age-birth state and gender differences.34 The results in Tables C.5 and
C.6 are very similar to those of Table C.3 and Table C.4, where the marriage
market is defined as the current state of residence. Since the educational dis-
tributions of blacks and whites by birth states have an almost identical impact
on the black male IMP, it is very unlikely that endogenous moving decisions
are generating the results of this study.
4.4 Conclusion
This study aims to answer the following questions: (1)Through which
mechanisms does human capital affect interracial marriage decisions? (2)How
do different black and white education distributions affect the IMP of a black
male? and (3)What are the implications of increasing educational attainment?
I modeled and tested the mechanisms through which human capital
may affect the probability of interracial marriages. The racial adaptability
effect predicts that as educational attainment increases, the probability of in-
terracial marriage increases, since the individual is exposed to a more diverse
pool of marriage candidates. The assortative mating effect, however, takes
education distributions of blacks and whites into account. For instance, given
34See Appendix C for Table C.5 and Table C.6.
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that a highly educated black male prefers to marry a highly educated black
female, if the probability of his finding a highly educated black female is lower
than the probability of his finding a highly educated white female, he may
be willing to trade racial similarities for educational similarities. The assor-
tative mating effect predicts that the probability of exogamy is higher for a
highly educated black man who resides in a relatively high mean white-black
education gap metropolitan area, controlling for the dispersion of education.
I use a two-sided matching model with ex ante intra- and inter-group
heterogeneity. Preference for a same-race spouse is captured by a term that
discounts the interracial marriage output. The racial adaptability effect op-
erates through the discount factor, which depends negatively on educational
level of a black male. The empirical results suggest that the racial adaptabil-
ity effect, which is captured by the marginal effect of individual education on
IMP, is statistically significant in the absence of variables that define the edu-
cational distributions of blacks and whites. I find that individual education is
important in explaining the black male IMP. An additional year of education
increases the IMP for an average black male by 0.4 percentage points.
The direct effect of individual education vanishes, however, once one
accounts for the differences in the distributions of education between blacks
and whites. The probability of exogamy depends on the mean white and
black educational levels and the mean educational gap in the geographical
area. An additional year of education obtained by an average black male in
the metropolitan area with the highest educational gap increases his IMP up
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to 0.86 percentage points, while an additional year of education obtained by
an average black male in the metropolitan area with the lowest educational
gap decreases his IMP by 0.2 percentage points. The results suggest that
differences in the distributions of education between blacks and whites have
a direct effect on the rate of interracial marriage between those groups. The
assortative mating effect of education is the dominant mechanism through
which human capital affects black-white interracial marriages.
Marriages between different racial groups improve the health of the
interracial interactions in a multiracial society. However, increasing the edu-
cational level of a black male will not always cause an increase in his IMP: that
male’s IMP depends on the relative education distributions of different races.
Contrary to what is expected, as blacks and whites become more similar in
terms of education, a highly educated black male’s interracial marriage proba-
bility may not increase. Interracial marriages may not become more frequent
as educational differences between races disappear.
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Table 4.1: Average Educational Attainment
Black Male Wife Black Female Husband
Interracially Married 13.42 13.59 13.95 14.04
(2.27) (2.3) (2.39) (2.68)
[6,237] [6,237] [2,125] [2,125]
6.54% 2.33%
Intraracially Married 12.97 13.33 13.33 12.97
(2.33) (2.25) (2.25) (2.33)
[89,191] [89,191] [89,191] [89,191]
93.46% 97.67%
Source: The 5 percent sample of 2000 IPUMS U.S. Census data. The sample is restricted to the non-
Hispanic blacks and whites aged 25 to 54. The educational attainment in years. Standard deviations are
given in parentheses, and the number of observations are given in brackets.
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Table 4.2: Effect of Human Capital on Interracial Marriage for Black Males:
Marginal Effects After Probit Regression, Pooled Age, Variation in Distribu-
tions of Education by Metropolitan Areas and Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
edubij .0037∗∗ .0035∗∗ −.0033 −.0004
(.0003) (.0003) (.0127) (.0009)
edubj × edubij −.0031∗∗
(.0011)






(eduwj − edubj)× edubij .0032∗∗
(.0007)
(eduwj − edubj) −.0357∗∗
(.0107)
σbj −.0047 −.0077 −.0097
(.0057) (.0062) (.0062)
σwj −.0050 −.0280∗∗ −.0096
(.0072) (.0078) (.0073)
Population
Total×10−5 −.0577∗∗ −.0753∗∗ −.0560∗∗
(.0117) (.0118) (.0116)
Black Male .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00001)
Black Male Available −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Black Female Available .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Mean of Dependent Predicted .0730 .0730 .0730 .0730
Probability(at x̄) .0647 .0585 .0581 .0584
Observations (N) 88,819 88,819 88,819 88,819
Log Pseudo Likelihood -22,042 -21,208 -21,167 -21,193
F-Stat:
eduwj = −edubj 2.34
(.126)




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0038 .0058 .0014
(.0056) (.0058) (.0058)
bm/wf −.1590∗∗ −.1458∗∗ −.1583∗∗
(.0108) (.0106) (.0108)
wm/bf .0009∗∗ .0009∗∗ .0010∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
wm/wf .0681∗ .0139 .0653∗
(.0290) (.0296) (.0290)
Age −.0047∗∗ −.0045∗∗ −.0046∗∗ −.0045∗∗
(.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0010)
Age2 .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
North East −.0499∗∗ −.0232∗∗ −.0158∗∗ −.0245∗∗
(.0016) (.0030) (.0034) (.0029)
Midwest −.0443∗∗ −.0175∗∗ −.0080∗∗ −.0179∗∗
(.0017) (.0030) (.0035) (.0030)
South −.1061∗∗ −.0408∗∗ −.0269∗∗ −.0411∗∗
(.0027) (.0040) (.0044) (.0041)
Mean of Dependent .0730 .0730 .0730 .0730
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0647 .0585 .0581 .0584
Observations (N) 88,819 88,819 88,819 88,819
Log Pseudo Likelihood -22,042 -21,208 -21,167 -21,193
F-Stat:
eduwj = −edubj 2.34
(.126)
eduwj × edubij = −edubj × edubij 0.04
(.837)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites
aged 25-54. Metropolitan areas with less than 50 observations in any gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this
table are the marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from
a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5%
and 10% significance levels.
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Table 4.3: Effect of Human Capital on Interracial Marriage for Black Males:
Marginal Effects After Probit Regression, Pooled Age, Variation in Distribu-
tions of Education by Metropolitan Areas, Race and Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edubij .0035∗∗ −.0017 .0004 .0001 0001
(.0003) (.0141) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010)
edubmj × edubij .0005
(.0018)
edubfj × edubij −.0039+
(.0021)
eduwmj × edubij −.0044
(.0033)










(eduwmj − edubmj)× edubij −.0013 −.0046 −.0046
(.0016) (.0029) (.0029)
(eduwmj − edubmj) −.0192 .0393 .0393
(.0228) (.0398) (.0398)
(eduwfj − edubfj)× edubij .0050∗∗ .0080∗∗ .0038+
(.0019) (.0030) (.0020)
(eduwfj − edubfj) −.0134 −.0739+ −.0054
(.0267) (.0420) (.0284)
(edubmj − edubfj)× edubij .0042
(.0030)
(edubmj − edubfj) .0794+
(.0425)
(edubmj − eduwfj)× edubij −.0042
(.0030)
(edubmj − eduwfj) .0794+
(.0425)
Mean of Dependent .0716 .0716 .0716 .0716 .0716
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0578 .0571 .0574 .0574 .0574
Observations (N) 88,296 88,296 88,296 88,296 88,296
Log Pseudo Likelihood -20,806 -20,710 -20,740 -20,736 -20,736
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Table 4.3: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σbmj −.0170∗∗ −.0102+ −.0166∗∗ −.0136∗∗ −.0136∗∗
(.0049) (.0053) (.0051) (.0053) (.0052)
σbfj .0105∗ .0015 .0050 .0042 .0042
(.0059) (.0059) (.0058) (.0053) (.0059)
σwmj −.0070 −.0307∗ −.0114 −.0124 −.0124
(.0126) (.0129) (.0127) (.0126) (.0126)
σwfj .0063 .0200 .0144 .0174 .0174
(.0146) (.0145) (.0145) (.0144) (.0144)
Population
Total×10−5 −.0619∗∗ −.0521∗∗ −.0355∗∗ −.0372∗∗ −.0371∗∗
(.0117) (.0120) (.0119) (.0119) (.0119)
Black Male .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Male Available −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.000001) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Black Female Available .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00001) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0262∗∗ .0478∗∗ .0429∗∗ .0483∗∗ .0483∗∗
(.0070) (.0078) (.0075) (.0079) (.0079)
bm/wf −.1267∗∗ −.0967∗∗ −.1105∗∗ −.1061∗∗ −.1061∗∗
(.0102) (.0100) (.0100) (.0101) (.0101)
wm/bf .0020∗∗ .0016∗∗ .0017∗∗ .0017∗∗ .0016∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
wm/wf .0048 −.0483 .0050 .0084 −.0085
(.0298) (.0305) (.0290) (.0299) (.0106)
Age −.0046∗∗ −.0046∗∗ −.0046∗∗ −.0045∗∗ −.0045∗∗
(.0011) (.0011) (.0010) (.0011) (.0011)
Age2 .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
North East −.0166∗∗ −.0073+ −.0169∗∗ −.0146∗∗ −.0146∗∗
(.0032) (.0038) (.0032) (.0034) (.0034)
Midwest −.0067∗ .0065 −.0051 −.0035 −.0035
(.0033) (.0041) (.0033) (.0034) (.0034)
South −.0266∗∗ −.0111∗∗ −.0255∗∗ −.0236∗∗ −.0247∗∗
(.0039) (.0043) (.0038) (.0039) (.0039)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites
aged 25-54. Metropolitan areas with less than 50 observations in any gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this
table are the marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from
a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5%
and 10% significance levels.
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Black Male Black Female
Interracial Marriage Rates for Black Males and Black Females
Source: 1962-2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement data are used to
match spouses and to calculate IMRs. This sample contains individuals who are at least
16 years old. The IMR for a black male (female) defined as the proportion of black males
(females) with white spouses to all married black males (females).
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Black Male Black Female
Interracial Marriage Rates (Alternative Definition) for Black Males and Black Females
Source: 1962-2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement data are used. This
sample contains individuals who are at least 16 years old. The IMR for a black male (female)
defined as the proportion of black males (females) with white spouses to all (married spouse









Figure 4.3: The Black and White Education Distributions
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Summary and Directions for Future Research
Human capital accumulation, migration and family formation received
significant attention from economists. This dissertation explores the role of
parents, statutes and education in individual choices regarding college success,
migration within the United States, and interracial marriage.
To gain a better understanding of the determinants of college success,
Chapter 2 used a micro data set that the authors created by matching admin-
istrative records with survey responses of students in the College of Economics
and Administrative Sciences of a private university in Turkey. The micro data
set has very detailed information, including college GPA for each semester,
scholarship status, post-graduation plans, number of younger and older sib-
lings, family income, gender, age, year in college, the score on Turkish Central
University Entrance Exam or the Student Selection Examination (SSE) score,
college major, parental education and occupations, and family business char-
acteristics. This data set provides a unique opportunity to control for many
aspects of individual heterogeneity in studying the links between parental char-
acteristics and children’s choices and outcomes.
Chapter 2 shows that self-employed parents and family businesses gen-
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erally have a negative impact on college students’ GPAs. Interestingly, pro-
fessionally employed parents do not adversely affect their offspring’s college
success. The results show that GPAs of male students with two self-employed
parents or with only a self-employed mother are the lowest. Parental self-
employment generally has a similar impact on female and male college stu-
dents’ GPAs. However, female students with only self-employed mothers have
higher GPAs than those female students without any self-employed parents.
The theoretical model implies that the lower GPAs of the children of
self-employed parents may stem from intergenerational ability transfers, bet-
ter access to managerial and industry-specific human capital, or nepotism.
Accounting for possible survey non-response bias and controlling for various
characteristics, we find that students with self-employed parents are not only
more likely to have entrepreneurial intent but also less likely to plan to attend
graduate school.
Chapter 2 suggests that parental self-employment and family businesses
affect the success and post-graduation plans of college students. Future studies
may involve understanding the relative importance of intergenerational ability
transfers, level of access to managerial and industry-specific human capital,
and influence of nepotism in generating these effects of self-employed parents
on their children’s entrepreneurial intent and college success.
Another direction for further research is to investigate the role of sib-
ling order and the number and gender of siblings on post-graduation plans
and college success. The preliminary results based on this data set show that
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the presence and number of older male and female siblings interact with the
self-employment status of the parents to affect students’ college success and
post-graduation plans. For instance, while having only older sister(s) positively
impacts college success of students with no self-employed parents, having only
older sister(s) negatively impacts college success of those with self-employed
parents. Interestingly, having only older brother(s) has no statistically signif-
icant effect on college GPAs of students without self-employed parents, while
having only older brother(s) has a positive impact on the college GPAs of the
students with self-employed parents.
Although cumulative college GPA serves as a good measure of college
success, future work may utilize the panel data on GPAs and consider the stan-
dard deviation of a student’s college GPA to measure consistency in reaching
and sustaining target GPAs. Another line of research would involve studying
the dynamic behavior of college students through college.
Chapter 3 focuses on the differential migration patterns of intra- and
interracially married black males during the Great Migration in the United
States among four different state groups categorized by the time of their ban
on anti-miscegenation laws. This study finds that anti-miscegenation laws in
individuals’ states of birth affects the sorting of intra- and interracially married
black males into destination states differentially. However, the younger gener-
ation of intra- and interracially married black males who entered the marriage
market after the removal of anti-miscegenation laws has different migration
patterns than the older generation of intra- and interracially married black
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males.
In Chapter 3, the empirical analysis is based on triple-differencing,
which involves interacting age, race of wife and the state of birth. Future
studies may include consideration of the distances travelled between birth and
destination states and differences in the relative supply of women of different
races in both birth and destination states. Chapter 3 exclusively focuses on
married black males, because interracial marriage is rarer for black females,
which causes imprecise estimates for black females. However, studying the
migration patterns of married black females may help to further our under-
standing of black/white relations. An important limitation of using the Census
data for migration studies is that it is impossible to identify an individual’s
complete migration history. Unfortunately no longitudinal data set matches
the sample size of the U.S. Census data. Nevertheless, one could use the infor-
mation on recent migrants from the U.S. Census data to validate the results.
Chapter 4 uses a two-sided matching model to understand the role of
education in black male/white female interracial marriages in the U.S. The
empirical analysis shows that individual education has a positive effect on a
black male’s Interracial Marriage Probability (IMP) if one fails to control for
variables that define the education distributions of blacks and whites in a mar-
riage market. However, once one accounts for these variables, the coefficient
of individual education is statistically insignificant, while its interaction with
differences between the educational distributions of blacks and whites is highly
significant. In particular, the IMP of a black male is especially strongly af-
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fected by the mean differences in white and black education levels and the
average education gap in the local marriage market. Chapter 4 suggests that
differences in education distributions between blacks and whites are important
in explaining IMP for a black male.
In Chapter 4, while I focus on the IMP of black males, it may be in-
teresting to extend this analysis to black females. Future work could expand
the analysis to include other types of relationships than marriage between
members of different races. Low interracial marriage rates among blacks and
whites are an indicator of the extent of legal partnership between these races.
Along this line, investigation of the role of education on the probability of
black/white cohabitation may help validate the results of this study. Going
even further afield, with the advent of online indicators of social interaction
(e.g., facebook.com), one might examine how racial aspects of these interac-





The Survey Questionnaire of Chapter 2
Dear Friends,
We ask you to participate in our survey that is designed to understand
the student profile. We want to investigate the determinants of academic
achievement of college students of one of the best universities in Turkey. Please
answer the questions correctly and as accurately as possible. The survey will
take 5 minutes and your correct and full responses will help us to understand
some student characteristics. No information provided by you will be seen
by third parties except the two main researchers and submitted information
will not be reported in a way that third parties can identify individuals. Af-
ter matching the student data with the academic records, the names will be
erased.
1. First and last name:
2. School number:
3. Age:
a)17 b)18 c)19 d)20 e)21 f)22 g)23 h)24+
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4. Gender: a) MALE b) FEMALE
5. Please write number of siblings you have:
I have .......Male;.......Female siblings.
6. Please write the ages of your BROTHERS (if it applies to you):....;....;....;....;.....
7. Please write the ages of your SISTERS (if it applies to you):....;....;....;....;....;....;.....
8. Does your family have any kind of business? a) YES b) NO
9. Did you go to the English Preparation class in University?
a) YES b) NO
10. Not counting the English Preparation year, Fall 2006 is your......semester
(please circle the correct semester).
a) 1st b) 2nd c) 3rd d) 4th e)5th f)6th g)7th h) 8 +
11. After graduating from college, I plan to:
a) Work in the family business.
b) Start a new business.
c) Work as an employee.
d) Work as an employee first and then work in the family business.
e) Work as an employee first and then start a new business.
f) Go to graduate school.
g) Other.
121
Consider your answer to the previous question and please write your
post-graduation plans if you were asked these questions in the semester/time
period below (Example: Ayse was planning to work in the family business
during her first year but she changed her plans in her second year and in the
third year with going to graduate school. In this case she would answer this
question as follows:
1stY ear a 2ndY ear f 3rdY ear f )
Please leave it blank for the semesters you were not enrolled.
12. 13. 14.








15. If you have a family business, please write the total number of peo-
ple (including those holding managerial posts) working in this business:............
16. If you have a family business, please write the TOTAL number of people
from the family who are working in the business:............
17. If you have a family business, please write the number of people involved
in it at managerial positions who are NOT from the family:............
18. If you have a family business, please write the number of people who ARE
from the family and who work in managerial positions:............
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19. Did you succeed in your first try at the University Entrance Exam (SSE)?
a) YES b) NO
20. What is your current GPA (as of the end of the last semester?) ...............
21. What was your English proficiency when you completed high school?
a) Beginner. b) Intermediate. c) Advanced.
22. What was your university entrance exam score corresponding to the area
(EQUALWEIGHT2)? .................
23. Please fill in the circle corresponding to your major.
© Business Admin. © Business Economics © Economics
© Econ.& Managemnt Honors © Economics Honors © Int’l Finance
© International Relations © Government
Academic year fellowship/scholarship: Please circle the one fits you.
Question Number→ 24. 25. 26. 27.
2006/2007 2005/2006 2004/2005 2003/2004
a) None a) a) a) a)
b) Turkish Edu. Ministry b) b) b) b)
c) University Merit F. c) c) c) c)
d) University Sports, Art F. d) d) d) d)
e) Other Fellowships. e) e) e) e)
28. Pick the type of high school you graduated from:
a) Private (English) f) Public Anatolian (English)
b) Private (Other Lang.) g) Public Anatolian.(Other Lang.)
c) Private Science. h) Public Science.
d) Private Other. i) Public Super.
e) Regular Public (Straight.) j) Public Other.
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29. Please rank the statement below from 1 to 5 (eg. 1= I totally disagree,
5=totally agree.)
• I take notes in classes:...................
• If you have a family business: I believe that my education will help me in
the family business:..................
• If you are planning to start a new business: I believe that my education will
help me in my future business:..................
30. On average how many hours a day do you study?...........
31. On average how many hours a day do you sleep?.............
32. Which group does your yearly family income fall into?
a) 0-20 thousand YTL
b) 20-40 thousand YTL
c) 40-60 thousand YTL
d) 60-80 thousand YTL
e) 80-100 thousand YTL
f) 100-120 thousand YTL
g) 120-140 thousand YTL
h) 140-160 thousand YTL
i) 160+ thousand YTL
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Please choose the education level of your;
Question Number→ 33. 34.
MOTHER FATHER
a) Grade school graduate/No formal Education. a) a)
b) Middle school graduate. b) b)
c) High school graduate. c) c)
d) University graduate. d) d)
e) Graduate school diploma. e) e)
Please choose the occupation of your;
Question Number→ 35. 36.
MOTHER FATHER
a) Housewife or Does not work. a) a)
b) Retired. b) b)
c) Wage earner, Works as an employee. c) c)
d) Self-Employed/Business owner/Employer. d) d)
e) Other Group/Professional e) e)
(Lawyer, Doctor, Auditor, Pharmacist etc.)
37. Please circle the option that applies to you. My parents are:
a) Divorced. b) Separated. c) Together. d) Other.
38. Who do you live with?
a) Both of my parents.
b) With my mother.
c) With my father.
d) My parents live out of Istanbul, I live in an apartment/dorm.




Definition of Steady State Nash Equilibrium
and Proofs in Chapter 4
B.1 Definition of Steady State Nash Equilibrium:
























α · pb + (1− α) · pw
Definition B.1: A steady state Nash Equilibrium is characterized by accep-
tance sets
χ = {Abbi, Abwi, Abbj, Awbj, Awwi, Awbi, Awwj, Abwj} such that, βV (Ari), βV (Arj),
βK(Ari, Ar′j) and βK(Ar′i, Arj) satisfy equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) for
i, j = 1, ., J and r, r′ = b, w; for all i,j=1,.,J, the following conditions hold: (i)
optimal reservation policy: the acceptance sets χ satisfy equation (4.4) and
(ii) optimal matching agreement: for r, r′ Ar′j ∈ Arr′i and Ari ∈ Arr′j and (iii)
steady state accounting: pb, pw and π satisfy (*).
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2.1:
Manipulating equation (4.6) I get,










(z −Rbi − θ(Abi))dFw(z|Abi)
}
0 = G(Rbi, Abi)
The derivative of the reservation type for a spouse of the same race with respect

































Therefore, the derivative of the reservation type for a spouse of the same race























B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2.2:
















always holds. Substituting dRbi
dAbi
















































B.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2.3:
Pr(IMP ) =
(1− π∗) ∫ Awj
R′bi
dFw(z|Abi)












































B.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2.4:
























Define fw = fw(Rbi|Abi), fb = fb(Rbi|Abi) and dFw = dFw(z|Abi) and dFb =











fb[1− Fw(Rbi|Abi)]− fw[1− Fb(Rbi|Abi)] > 0.
Since Fw(•|Abi) first order stochastically dominates Fb(•|Abi), this implies that
Fw(Rbi|Abi) < Fb(Rbi|Abi), while Rbi ∈ (Ab, Ab). Therefore, [1−Fw(Rbi|Abi)] >
[1−Fb(Rbi|Abi)] holds when Rbi ∈ (Ab, Ab). Since the distributions are identical
except µb < µw, they only cross once at κ =
µb+µw
2
. Therefore, as long as
Ab < Rbi ≤ κ, it remains true that fb(Rbi|Abi) ≥ fw(Rbi|Abi).1 If A∗bi is such
that Ab < Rb(A
∗
bi) ≤ κ, dPr(IMP )dAbi > 0.
1Which is more likely given educational levels.
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Appendix C
Additional Tables in Chapter 4
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Table C.1: Effect of Human Capital on Interracial Marriage for Black Males:
Marginal Effects After Probit, Metropolitan Areas (MAs) Incompletely Iden-
tified Less Than 10 Percent, Variation in Distributions of Education by MAs
and Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
edubij .0037
∗∗ .0036∗∗ −.0072 −.00001
(.0003) (.0003) (.0133) (.0010)
edubj × edubij −.0026∗
(.0012)







(eduwj − edubj)× edubij .0030∗∗
(.0007)
(eduwj − edubj) −.0308∗∗
(.0110)
σbj −.0098 −.0156∗ −.0167∗
(.0061) (.0067) (.0067)
σwj −.0007 −.0263∗∗ -.0075
Population (.0077) (.0084) (.0079)
Total×10−5 −.0496∗∗ −.0668∗∗ −.0478∗∗
(.0122) (.0123) (.0121)
Black Male .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00001)
Black Male Available −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.00008∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Black Female Available .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
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Table C.1: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Ratio (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
bm/bf .0051 .0066 .0024
(.0058) (.0060) (.0060)
bm/wf −.1484∗∗ −.1317∗∗ −.1457∗∗
(.0119) (.0118) (.0120)
wm/bf .0009∗∗ .0009∗∗ .0010∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
wm/wf .05921+ −.0056 .0454
(.0301) (.0307) (.0302)
Age −.0048∗∗ −.0045∗∗ −.0046∗∗ −.0046∗∗
(.0012) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
Age2 .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
North East −.0523∗∗ −.0254∗∗ −.0185∗∗ −.0270∗∗
(.0016) (.0030) (.0035) (.0030)
Midwest −.0466∗∗ −.0194∗∗ −.0100∗∗ −.0199∗∗
(.0017) (.0031) (.0037) (.0031)
South −.1036∗∗ −.0416∗∗ −.0282∗∗ −.0420∗∗
(.0027) (.0042) (.0046) (.0042)
Mean of Dependent .0741 .0741 .0741 .0741
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0658 .0603 .0599 .0601
Observations (N) 83,370 83,370 83,370 83,370
Log Pseudo Likelihood -20,904 -20,179 -20,141 -20,164
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites aged
25-54. Metropolitan areas with less than 50 observations in any gender/race cell and the ones incompletely identified by more
than 10% were omitted. The entries are in this table are the marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The
linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators.
∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
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Table C.2: Effect of Human Capital on Interracial Marriage for Black Males:
Marginal Effects After Probit, MAs Incompletely Identified Less Than 10 Per-
cent, Variation in Distributions of Education by MAs, Race and Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edubij .0036∗∗ −.0069 .0006 .0003 0003
(.0003) (.0148) (.0010) (.0010) (.0011)
edubmj × edubij .0009
(.0019)
edubfj × edubij −.0037+
(.0022)
eduwmj × edubij −.0050
(.0034)










(eduwmj − edubmj)× edubij −.0015 .0382 −.0045
(.0017) (.0414) (.0030)
(eduwmj − edubmj) −.0182 .0302 .0382
(.0243) (.0382) (.0414)
(eduwfj − edubfj)× edubij .0049∗ .0079∗ .0039∗
(.0020) (.0032) (.0021)
(eduwfj − edubfj) −.0080 −.0665 .0102
(.0248) (.0441) (.0303)
(edubmj − edubfj)× edubij .0040
(.0032)
(edubmj − edubfj) .0768+
(.0443)





Mean of Dependent .0726 .0726 .0726 .0726 .0726
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0594 .0587 .0590 .0590 .0589
Observations (N) 82,869 82,869 82,869 82,869 82,869
Log Pseudo Likelihood -19,794 -19,698 -19,723 -19,719 -19,719
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Table C.2: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σbmj −.0213∗∗ −.0163∗∗ −.0221∗∗ −.0190∗∗ −.0190∗∗
(.0053) (.0057) (.0056) (.0057) (.0057)
σbfj .0091 .0006 .0043 .0035 .0035
(.0063) (.0063) (.0062) (.0063) (.0063)
σwmj −.0168 −.0471∗∗ −.0276∗ −.0290∗ −.0290∗
(.0133) (.0137) (.0134) (.0134) (.0134)
σwfj .0227 .0356∗ .0306∗ .0339∗ .0339∗
(.0153) (.0152) (.0152) (.0152) (.0152)
Population
Total×10−5 −.0548∗∗ −.0442∗∗ −.0275∗ −.0291∗ −.0291∗
(.0123) (.0125) (.0124) (.0124) (.0124)
Black Male .0002∗∗ .0002∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female −.0002∗∗ −.0002∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Male Available −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗ −.0001∗∗
(.000001) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Black Female Available .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗ .0001∗∗
(.00001) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0302∗∗ .0536∗∗ .0495∗∗ .0550∗∗ .0550∗∗
(.0073) (.0083) (.0079) (.0083) (.0083)
bm/wf −.1147∗∗ −.0772∗∗ −.0922∗∗ −.0878∗∗ −.0878∗∗
(.0112) (.0109) (.0110) (.0110) (.0110)
wm/bf .0020∗∗ .0016∗∗ .0017∗∗ .0017∗∗ .0016∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
wm/wf −.0245 −.0871∗∗ −.0345 −.0479 −.0479
(.0310) (.0318) (.0309) (.0313) (.0312)
Age −.0046∗∗ −.0046∗∗ −.0046∗∗ −.0045∗∗ −.0045∗∗
(.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
Age2 .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗ .00003∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
North East −.0187∗∗ −.0097∗ −.0191∗∗ −.0169∗∗ −.0169∗∗
(.0033) (.0039) (.0032) (.0035) (.0034)
Midwest −.0087∗ .0044 −.0069∗ −.0054 −.0054
(.0034) (.0041) (.0033) (.0035) (.0035)
South −.0268∗∗ −.0125∗∗ −.0264∗∗ −.0247∗∗ −.0247∗∗
(.0040) (.0045) (.0040) (.0041) (.0041)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites
aged 25-54. Metropolitan areas with less than 50 observations in any gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this
table are the marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from
a consistent variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5%
and 10% significance levels.
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Table C.3: Current State of Residence: Effect of Human Capital on Inter-
racial Marriage for Black Males, Marginal Effects After Probit, Variation in
Distributions of Education by State, Race and Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
edubi .0037∗∗ .0033∗∗ .0092 −.0004
(.0003) (.0002) (.0114) (.0011)
edubj × edubij −.0042∗∗
(.0013)






(eduwj − edubj)× edubij .0039∗∗
(.0011)
(eduwj − edubj) −.0356∗
(.0162)
σbj −.0330∗∗ −.0239∗∗ −.0476∗∗
(.0058) (.0070) (.0068)
σwj .0240∗∗ .0286∗∗ .0355∗∗
(.0080) (.0081) (.0083)
Population
Total×10−5 .0431∗∗ .0399∗∗ .0444∗∗
(.0091) (.0072) (.0085)
Black Male .00002∗∗ .00002∗ .00001∗
(.71×10−5) (.72×10−5) (.71×10−5)
Black Female −.00002∗ .64×10−5 −.00001∗
(.82×10−5) (.81×10−5) (.81×10−5)
Black Male Available .87× 10−5 .00003∗∗ .31×10−5
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0193 .0054 −.0207+
(.0123) (.0120) (.0121)
bm/wf −.0787∗∗ −.0797∗∗ −.0981∗∗
(.0191) (.0123) (.0157)
wm/bf .0012∗∗ .0011∗∗ .0012∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
wm/wf .0141 .0862∗ .0279
(.0431) (.0398) (.0429)
Age −.0042∗∗ −.0052∗∗ −.0036∗∗ −.0044∗∗
(.0009) (.0011) (.0010) (.0010)
Age2 .00002+ .00003∗ .00001 .00002+
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
North East −.0452∗∗ −.0265∗∗ −.0179∗∗ −.0291∗∗
(.0015) (.0029) (.0033) (.0027)
Midwest −.0369∗∗ −.0197∗∗ −.0039 −.0169∗∗
(.0016) (.0029) (.0037) (.0031)
South −.1198∗∗ −.0347∗∗ −.0132∗∗ −.0308∗∗
(.0029) (.0044) (.0044) (.0045)
Mean of Dependent .0714 .0714 .0714 .0714
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0616 .0570 .0559 .0567
Observations (N) 110,373 110,373 110,373 110,373
Log Pseudo Likelihood -26,697 -25,927 -25,846 -25,903
F-Stat:
eduwj = −edubj 14.22∗∗
(.000)
eduwj × edubij = −edubj × edubij 0.72
(.396)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites aged
25-54. States with less than 50 observations in any age/gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this table are the
marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent
variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels.
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Table C.4: Current State of Residence: Effect of Human Capital on Inter-
racial Marriage for Black Males, Marginal Effects After Probit, Variation in
Distributions of Education by State, Race, Age and Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edubi .0032∗∗ .0024 −.0005 −.0007 −.0007
(.0003) (.0127) (.0010) (.0011) (.0011)
edubmj × edubij −.0031
(.0019)
edubfj × edubij −.0002
(.0027)
eduwmj × edubij .0027
(.0015)










(eduwmj − edubmj)× edubij .0024+ .0022 .0022
(.0014) (.0015) (.0015)
(eduwmj − edubmj) −.0370+ −.0125 −.0125
(.0214) (.0225) (.0225)
(eduwfj − edubfj)× edubij .0011 .0011 .0002
(.0022) (.0021) (.0025)
(eduwfj − edubfj) .0114 −.0137 .0400
(.0315) (.0308) (.0368)
(edubmj − edubfj)× edubij −.0009
(.0017)
(edubmj − edubfj) .0537∗
(.0255)
(edubmj − eduwfj)× edubij −.0009
(.0017)
(edubmj − eduwfj) .0537∗
(.0255)
Mean of Dependent .0711 .0711 .0711 .0711 .0711
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0567 .0557 .0564 .0563 .0563
Observations (N) 110,233 110,233 110,233 110,233 110,233
Log Pseudo Likelihood -25,798 -25,720 -25,769 -25,756 -25,756
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Table C.4: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σbmj −.0216∗∗ −.0108 −.0286∗∗ −.0204∗∗ −.0203∗∗
(.0063) (.0073) (.0070) (.0072) (.0072)
σbfj −.0213∗∗ −.0181∗∗ −.0245∗∗ −.0204∗∗ −.0304∗∗
(.0063) (.0064) (.0063) (.0064) (.0065)
σwmj .0312∗ −.0068∗∗ .0109 −.0037 .0037
(.0136) (.0141) (.0139) (.0140) (.0140)
σwfj .0011 .0581∗∗ .0427∗ .0522∗∗ .03522∗∗
(.0160) (.0177) (.0175) (.0176) (.0176)
Population
Total×10−5 .0468∗∗ .0434∗∗ .0509∗∗ .0469∗∗ .0469∗∗
(.0087) (.0070) (.0081) (.0075) (.0075)
Black Male .00001∗ .99.10−5 .0001∗∗ .98.10−5 .98.10−5
(.72.10−5) (.72.10−5) (.71.10−5) (.71.10−5) (.71.10−5)
Black Female −.00002∗ .42.10−5 −.00001∗∗ −.00001+ −.00001+
(.84.10−5) (.85.10−5) (.83.10−5) (.84.10−5) (.84.10−5)
Black Male Available −.00001 .00002+ −.00001 .41.10−5 .41.10−5
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female Available .94.10−5 −.00003∗ (.39.10−5) .30.10−5 .30.10−5
(.00001) (.00001) (.00002) (.00001) (.00001)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0389∗∗ .0345∗ .0412∗∗ .0448∗∗ .0448∗∗
(.0142) (.0141) (.0142) (.0142) (.0142)
bm/wf −.0652∗∗ −.0880∗∗ −.0970∗∗ −.0935∗∗ −.0936∗∗
(.0179) (.0117) (.0146) (.0135) (.0135)
wm/bf .0017∗∗ .0013∗∗ .0016∗∗ .0015∗∗ .0015∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
wm/wf .0159 .1514∗∗ .0506 .0926∗ .09268
(.0458) (.0439) (.0457) (.0458) (.0458)
Age −.0058∗∗ −.0025∗∗ −.0043∗∗ −.0027∗ −.0027∗∗
(.0010) (.0011) (.0011) (.0012) (.0011)
Age2 .00004∗∗ .95×10−6 .00002+ .95× 10−5 .94× 10−5
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Northeast −.0232∗∗ −.0130∗∗ −.0264∗∗ −.0194∗∗ −.0194∗∗
(.0031) (.0039) (.0030) (.0036) (.0036)
Midwest −.0162∗∗ .0025 −.0119∗∗ −.0074+ −.0074+
(.0032) (.0041) (.0034) (.0037) (.0037)
South −.0292∗∗ −.0073+ −.0248∗∗ −.0183∗∗ −.0182∗∗
(.0045) (.0045) (.0045) (.0046) (.0046)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites aged
25-54. States with less than 50 observations in any age/gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this table are the
marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent
variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels.
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Table C.5: Birth State: Effect of Human Capital on Interracial Marriage
for Black Males, Marginal Effects After Probit, Variation in Distributions of
Education by State, Race and Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
edubij .0037∗∗ .0033∗∗ .0165 .00001
(.0003) (.0003) (.0137) (.0009)
edubj × edubij −.0052∗∗
(.0015)






(eduwj − edubj)× edubij .0040∗∗
(.0011)
(eduwj − edubj) −.0558∗∗
(.0156)
σbj −.0143+ −.0107 −.0119
(.0075) (.0081) (.0080)
σwj .0212∗ .0205∗ .0185∗
(.0088) (.0092) (.0092)
Population
Total×10−5 .0051 −.0003 .0043
(.0052) (.0059) (.0051)
Black Male .00002∗ .00003∗ .00002∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female −.00002∗ −.00002∗ −.00002+
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Male Available −.00002+ −.00003∗ −.00003∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female Available .00001 .00001 .00001
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Mean of Dependent .0733 .0733 .0733 .0733
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0618 .0601 .0599 .0600
Observations (N) 98,453 98,453 98,453 98,453
Log Pseudo Likelihood -26,779 -23,801 -23,793 -23,794
F-Stat:
eduwj = −edubj 2.79+
(.094)




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0216 .0288+ .0228
(.0159) (.0163) (.0159)
bm/wf −.0257∗∗ −.0257∗∗ −.0252∗∗
(.0072) (.0070) (.0072)
wm/bf .0005∗∗ .0005∗∗ .0005∗∗
(.00007) (.00007) (.00007)
wm/wf .0678 .0613 .0666
(.0616) (.0611) (.0615)
Age −.0041∗∗ −.0032∗∗ −.0032∗∗ −.0032∗∗
(.0009) (.0012) (.0011) (.0012)
Age2 .00002+ .79× 10−5 .73× 10−5 .82× 10−5
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
North East −.0449∗∗ −.0326∗∗ −.0318∗∗ −.0322∗∗
(.0015) (.0019) (.0020) (.0020)
Midwest −.0372∗∗ −.0382∗∗ −.0380∗∗ −.0384∗∗
(.0017) (.0017) (.0017) (.0017)
South −.1207∗∗ −.1044∗∗ −.1038∗∗ −.1043∗∗
(.0029) (.0035) (.0035) (.0035)
Mean of Dependent .0733 .0733 .0733 .0733
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0618 .0601 .0599 .0600
Observations (N) 98,453 98,453 98,453 98,453
Log Pseudo Likelihood -26,779 -23,801 -23,793 -23,794
F-Stat:
eduwj = −edubj 2.79+
(.094)
eduwj × edubij = −edubj × edubij 1.42
(.232)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites aged
25-54. States with less than 50 observations in any age/gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this table are the
marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent
variance-covariance matrix using Huber-White sandwich estimators. ∗∗, ∗ and + indicate respectively 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels.
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Table C.6: Birth State: Effect of Human Capital on Interracial Marriage
for Black Males, Marginal Effects After Probit, Variation in Distributions of
Education by State, Race, Age and Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edubij .0033∗∗ .0199 −.0001 −.0001 −.0001
(.0003) (.0147) (.0010) (.0013) (.0013)
edubmj × edubij −.0030
(.0031)
edubfj × edubij −.0021
(.0035)
eduwmj × edubij .0031
(.0019)










(eduwmj − edubmj)× edubij .0025 .0025 .0025
(.0018) (.0018) (.0018)
(eduwmj − edubmj) −.0722∗∗ −.0611∗ −.0611∗
(.0261) (.0273) (.0273)
(eduwfj − edubfj)× edubij .0013 .0013 .0014
(.0022) (.0022) (.0035)
(eduwfj − edubfj) .0253 .0116 .0309
(.0313) (.0323) (.0483)
(edubmj − edubfj)× edubij .00007
(.0027)
(edubmj − edubfj) .0193
(.0394)
(edubmj − eduwfj)× edubij .00007
(.0027)
(edubmj − eduwfj) .0193
(.0394)
Mean of Dependent .0732 .0732 .0732 .0732 .0732
Predicted Probability(at x̄) .0600 .0597 .0598 .0598 .0598
Observations (N) 98,350 98,350 98,350 98,350 98,350
Log Pseudo Likelihood -23,736 -23,712 -23,716 -23,714 -23,714
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Table C.6: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σbmj .0243∗∗ .0399∗∗ .0366∗∗ .0397∗∗ .0397∗∗
(.0069) (.0075) (.0073) (.0075) (.0075)
σbfj −.0431∗∗ −.0467∗∗ −.0455∗∗ −.0489∗∗ −.0488∗∗
(.0080) (.0083) (.0080) (.0082) (.0082)
σwmj −.0008 .0025 .0058 .0068 .0068
(.0135) (.0137) (.0130) (.0132) (.0132)
σwfj .0233 .0236 .0171 .0164 .0163
(.0154) (.0165) (.0153) (.0155) (.0155)
Population
Total×10−5 .0050 .0060 .0120∗ .0098+ .0098+
(.0053) (.0063) (.0055) (.0056) (.0056)
Black Male .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female −.00001 −.00001 −.00002 −.00001 −.00001
(.000001) (.00001) (.00002) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Male Available −.00003+ −.00003∗ −.00003∗∗ −.00003∗ −.00003∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Black Female Available .00001 .00002 .00003+ .00002 .00002
(.00001) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Sex Ratio
bm/bf .0730∗∗ .0938∗∗ .0813∗∗ .0893∗∗ .0893∗∗
(.0282) (.0284) (.0282) (.0283) (.0283)
bm/wf −.0239∗∗ −.0259∗∗ −.0275∗∗ −.0254∗∗ −.0254∗∗
(.0071) (.0075) (.0076) (.0075) (.0075)
wm/bf .0005∗∗ .0005∗∗ .0005∗∗ .0005∗∗ .0005∗∗
(.00008) (.00008) (.00008) (.0008) (.00008)
wm/wf .0761 .0564 .0671 .0653 .0653
(.0647) (.0635) (.0635) (.0634) (.0634)
Age −.0041∗∗ −.0039∗∗ −.0044∗∗ −.0040∗∗ −.0040∗∗
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
Age2 .00002 .00001 .00003+ .00002 .00002
(.00002) (.00001) (.00001) (.00002) (.00002)
North East −.0325∗∗ −.0324∗∗ −.0331∗∗ −.0325∗∗ −.0326∗∗
(.0019) (.0020) (.0020) (.0021) (.0021)
Midwest −.0372∗∗ −.0371∗∗ −.0374∗∗ −.0373∗∗ −.0373∗
(.0017) (.0018) (.0017) (.0018) (.0018)
South −.1032∗∗ −.1038∗∗ −.1044∗∗ −.1042∗∗ −.1042∗∗
(.0035) (.0036) (.0036) (.0036) (.0036)
Source: 5 percent IPUMS, 2000 U.S. Census Data Set. The sample is restricted to the non-Hispanic blacks and whites aged
25-54. States with less than 50 observations in any age/gender/race cell were omitted. The entries are in this table are the
marginal effects after probit. Census weights are employed. The linearized standard errors are derived from a consistent
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